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ABSTRACT
The Internet is becoming the primary manner in which some attorneys serve
clients. States have already taken differing views on whether it is acceptable for an
attorney to engage in electronic representations of clients. Thus, determining what
jurisdiction's law applies to such attorney conduct can be very important in deciding
whether this activity constitutes the unauthorized practice of law and, if not, deter-
mining the exact duties of an attorney in such representations.
This Article argues that the current version of Model Rule of Professional Respon-
sibility 8.5(b), which governs choice of ethics law, can be interpreted to apply the legal
ethics rules of the state in which the attorney is located to all electronic represen-
tations. The dormant commerce clause, however, prohibits a state from regulating ac-
tivity that does not occur or have a significant effect in its physical boundaries. It is
not clear that the state in which the lawyer is located has a significant enough inter-
est, under a dormant commerce clause analysis, to prohibit, or even regulate, this type
of representation in most situations. Often, the effect of an electronic representation
will be born wholly by the other state where the client is located, and this state's ethical
regime would be ignored under the likely interpretation of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2).
Therefore, jurisdictions should either eliminate the language from the rule that
results in the application of the ethics regime of the attorney's home jurisdiction in
all situations or define key terms in the rule to focus the analysis on the location of the
client affected and the jurisdiction where the legal advice provided is acted upon.
Either option will allow for the application of the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where
the client is physically located when the most significant effect from the represen-
tation is felt in the client's home jurisdiction. Because this state has a much more
significant interest in protecting the resident client from potentially damaging legal
representations, this jurisdiction more properly should determine the manner in which
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attorneys can represent its residents and whether any constraints should be placed on
electronic representations.
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INTRODUCTION
The global nature of the Internet and the jurisdictional limitations
on the practice of law following geographical boundaries raise
troubling issues for lawyers of regulatory compliance, jurisdiction
and choice of law.'
The Internet has changed the manner in which attorneys serve and procure
clients. For example, e-mail now allows attorneys to respond to clients more quickly
and with less cost.2 Attorneys now can also file a document electronically in many
Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-85
(1998).
2 See Brett R. Harris, Counseling Clients Over the Internet, 18 COMPUTER & INTERNET
LAW. 4,4 (2001) (noting that e-mail "can be transmitted quickly and without undue expense"
and that e-mail "at times [is] more practical and economical than telephone or facsimile trans-
missions"). Additionally, the use of e-mail attachments can speed up client review of document
drafts and consequently increase the speed at which attorneys can draft and have documents
filed. John A. Wetenkamp, Note, The Impact of E-mail on Attorney Practice and Ethics, 34
MCGEORGE L. REV. 135, 136 (2002) (stating that e-mail can "save clients money because it
tends to streamline communications and it costs less than a telephone call"); see Harris, supra,
at 4 (stating that e-mail attachments can "be revised by the recipients electronically and then re-
turned to the sender, in effect creating a collaborative effort to get documents into final form").
Attorney use of e-mail to communicate with clients originally was controversial. See Jason
Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort, A.B.A. J., July 2003, at 42,43 (discussing the "debate within
the legal community" from 1995 to 1999 "about whether it was safe to practice law over the
Internet" and stating that some firms even issued bans on attorney use of e-mail). In 1999, the
American Bar Association ("ABA") issued an ethics opinion stating that a lawyer could trans-
mit client information by e-mail under most circumstances without violating professional ethics
rules. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (finding
that an attorney can "transmit information relating to the representation of a client by
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Interet" without violating professional ethics rules "because
the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of privacy from a technological
and legal standpoint"). Many attorneys now routinely communicate with clients through e-mail.
See ABA Legal Technology Resource Center, June 2000 Telephone Survey: How Attorneys
Use E-Mail, http://www.lawtechnology.org/surveys/june2000.html (last visited Sept. 11,2006)
(indicating that, according to a June 2000 telephone survey, ninety-four percent of attorneys
used e-mail in their practices and seventy-one used e-mail to communicate with clients).
Despite the current widespread use of e-mail by attorneys to communicate with clients,
some commentators still point out the confidentiality risks posed by communicating with clients
in this manner due to the risk of unauthorized interception of e-mail. See, e.g., Robert M.
Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Taking the Lawyer's Craft into Virtual Space: Computer-
Mediated Interviewing, Counseling and Negotiating, 10 CLINIcAL L. REv. 115, 151 (2003)
("Concerns continue[] to exist regarding the ability of hackers and persons with ulterior
motives to intercept emails and also the capacity of service providers to intrude on communi-
cations."); R. Scot Hopkins & Pamela R. Reynolds, Redefining Privacy and Security in the
Electronic Communication Age: A Lawyer's Ethical Duty in the Virtual World of the Internet,
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courts.3 Additionally, the World Wide Web (the "Web") allows attorneys to market
themselves on a more widespread basis through law firm Web sites.4 The marketing
of legal services on the Web has become so pervasive that several freestanding Web
sites now exist with the purpose of matching potential clients with attorneys.5 Often,
allowing people to make their initial inquiry to an attorney through an e-mail or a client
intake form provided on a Web site eases an attorney's screening of potential clients.6
In a more dramatic development, the Internet is becoming the primary or, in some
cases, sole manner in which particular attorneys serve clients. Some of the Web sites
designed to match clients with attorneys also allow attorneys to provide legal advice
to clients directly through the site.7 On Internet "bulletin boards" or "newsgroups,"
potential clients post questions seeking legal advice under various legal topics, and
attorneys can provide legal advice by posting a reply. The potential also exists for
attorneys to participate in Internet "chat rooms" where they would respond in real
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 675,676 (2003) ("[T]he ease with which email communications may
be intercepted make it a particulary ripe target for even unsophisticated email thieves, and
that this attribute is unique to Internet email." (emphasis omitted)).
' Maria Perez Crist, The E-Brief: Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L. REV.
49, 54 (2003) (describing the federal courts' Case Management/Electronic Case Files program
that "allows attorneys to log in to court [W]eb sites with a court-issued password and submit
documents to the court electronically").
4 See generally Jason Krause, Making Rain on the Net, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2006, at 46,47-51
(discussing how law firms currently are marketing themselves on the Internet, including hosting
"blogs" on specific practice areas in which the firm practices, and how "more Americans use
[Internet] search engines to find a lawyer than any other source"). According to a recent ABA
survey, "all firms with 50 or more lawyers now have Web sites, and 68 percent of all firms
have a site." Id. at 48.
' See, e.g., AttomeyPages.com, http://www.attorneypages.com (last visited Sept. 13,2006);
Lawyers.com, http://www.lawyers.com (last visited Sept. 13,2006); LegalMatch.com, http:ll
www.legalmatch.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2006). "Many on-line directories are contained
within [W]eb sites as parts of other information and services. In other words, the directories
that help consumers find lawyers are a subsidiary part of a site with general consumer infor-
mation about legal issues or the subject matter of interest to the consumer." William Hornsby,
Improving the Delivery of Affordable Legal Services Through the Internet: A Blueprint for
the Shift to a Digital Paradigm, in CONFERENCE PROGRAM 7 (1999), http://www.unbundledlaw
.org/program/program.htm. Hornsby is Staff Counsel to the ABA Standing Committee on the
Delivery of Legal Services. Id. at 1.
6 See Terry Carter, Casting for Clients, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2004, at 35, 35, 37 (discussing an
attorney who screens potential clients through e-mail "which has the added value of being
more efficient than fielding phone calls" and a Web site, http://www.legalmatch.com, that
allows potential clients to "fill out forms online detailing their circumstances and problems" for
lawyer review); Hornsby, supra note 5, at 12 (stating that "law firms are using [W]eb sites
for automated intake and screening in several different practice settings").
' See, e.g., Lawyers.corn, http://www.lawyers.com (last visited Sept. 13,2006); LegalMatch
.com, http://www.legalmatch.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2006). For a discussion of how an
attorney-client relationship can be created through such Web sites, see infra Part I.C.
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time to posts seeking legal information.' In addition to these third party operated Web
sites, some attorneys are developing practices where they communicate with clients
solely through their firm Web site or e-mail.9
Electronic representations of clients, or what this Article loosely terms "e-
lawyering," are part of a larger, emerging trend in the legal profession to segment
or "unbundle"' ° legal services in an attempt to serve the largely unmet legal needs
of people with moderate to low income." In the past, states have had differing views
on the acceptability of nontraditional forums for attorneys to provide advice to clients.' 2
States already have taken differing views on whether it is acceptable for an attorney
to engage in electronic representations of clients. 3 Furthermore, practices in which
attorneys predominantly use the Internet to communicate with clients allow attor-
neys to more easily represent people that are physically located in other jurisdictions
' See infra Part I.A for a more in-depth description of electronic bulletin boards and chat
rooms that allow attorneys to provide legal advice to users.
9 See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
'0 "Unbundling" of legal services involves "a lawyer and client [agreeing] to limit represen-
tation to discrete, specified tasks." DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 100 (2004); see
also Mark Hansen, Helping Self-Helpers, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 72, 72 (describing unbun-
dling of legal services as situations when a "lawyer contracts to perform specific, limited
work for the client without taking on responsibility for the entire case").
" See Hansen, supra note 10, at 72 (noting that "since 2000, six states [California, Colorado,
Florida, Maine, Washington, and Wyoming] have formally adopted various changes in their
ethics codes or civil procedure rules to accommodate unbundling and assisted pro se represen-
tation" and "at least 11 other states have begun to study the issue actively").
12 See Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and
the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 218 (1999) (stating that "each time that lawyers have sought
to adapt existing media to answer legal questions posed by laypeople, the organized bar has
moved to regulate-potentially out of existence-such activity" and going on to examine how
different states have treated nontraditional forums for attorneys to provide legal advice where
the attorney has limited ability to follow up on the advice given or to ask additional questions
of the client).
'" Compare D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) (allowing "lawyers to take
part in on-line chat rooms and similar arrangements through which attorneys engage in back-
and-forth communications, in 'real time,' or nearly real time, with Internet users seeking
legal information," but advising attorneys that "if an attorney-client relationship is formed
through cyberspace communications" the "relationship brings to bear all of the responsibili-
ties and benefits defined under the D.C. Rules governing attorney-client relationships"), and
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (finding that "using the
Internet to take orders for trademark searches, conduct trademark searches, render legal opinions
and file trademark applications is analogous to conducting a law practice by telephone or fac-
simile machine and is likewise permissible, subject to the same restrictions applicable to com-
munication by those means"), with Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof I Conduct, Formal Op.
97-04 (1997) (stating that "lawyers should not answer specific legal questions from lay
people through the Internet unless the question presented is of a general nature and the advice
given is not fact-specific"), and Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. A-00-1 (2000)
(prohibiting "an attorney's participation in a chat room" as a direct, "in person" solicitation).
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where the attorney may not have a license to practice law. Therefore, determining
which jurisdiction's law applies to such attorney conduct can be very important in
deciding whether this activity constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. 4 Even
if some states allow such representations, those states may afford clients with different
protections and require attorneys to take different precautions when involved in an
electronic representation of a client. Consequently, the particular jurisdiction's ethics
rules that apply to such electronic representations is important in determining the
exact duties of an attorney.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") recently amended the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") to deal with various attorney multi-jurisdic-
tional practice issues, including Model Rule 8.5(b), which governs choice of ethics
law.' 5 Given how courts and state ethics committees have construed prior versions
of Model Rule 8.5(b), 16 the current language of Rule 8.5(b) is susceptible to an inter-
pretation that applies the legal ethics rules of the state in which the attorney is located
to all electronic representations.17 This raises concerns under the "dormant" aspect of
the Commerce Clause.
The dormant commerce clause prevents states from promulgating legislation or
regulations that frustrate or inhibit trade between states, even in the absence of congres-
sional legislation. 8 When a state's regulations prohibit activity that does not occur
or have significant effects within its physical boundaries, this often violates the dormant
commerce clause. 9 If in the context of Internet representations courts construe Model
Rule 8.5(b)(2) always to apply the legal ethics rules of the state in which the lawyer
is physically located, it is not clear that state has a significant enough interest, under
a dormant commerce clause analysis, to prohibit, or even regulate, this type of rep-
resentation in most situations. 20 This occurs because often the effect of an electronic
representation will be born wholly in the other state where the client is located, and this
is the state whose ethical regime would end up being ignored under the likely inter-
pretation of the current language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2).2'
"4 See, e.g., Free Advice, http://www.freeadvice.com (last visited Sept. 13,2006) (including
a disclaimer saying "[A] Forum should not be relied upon and is not a substitute from any attor-
ney licensed in your jurisdiction whom you have retained to represent you.").
'5 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 5.5, 8.5 (2002); see also infra Part II.C
(explaining recent amendments to Model Rule 8.5(b)).
16 See infra Part III.
'7 See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
18 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) ("For a hundred years it has been
accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional
legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce,
and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, [the United States Supreme Court], and not
the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands
of state and national interests.").
'9 See infra notes 179, 199-203 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Part VI.B.2.
21 See infra Part VI.C.
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A more sound choice of ethics rule under the dormant commerce clause would
be to use the current language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) without the safe harbor lan-
guage that will result in the application of the ethics regime of the attorney's home
jurisdiction in all situations. Another option would be to retain the safe harbor but
define key terms in the rule to focus the analysis on the location of the client affected
by the legal representation and the jurisdiction where the legal advice provided in
the representation is acted upon and takes effect. Either option would allow for the
application of ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the client is physically located in
situations when the most significant effect from the representation is felt in the client's
home jurisdiction.
This state has a much more significant interest in protecting the resident client
from incompetent and potentially damaging legal representations.22 Consequently,
this jurisdiction more properly should determine the manner in which attorneys can
represent its residents and whether any constraints should be placed on circumscribed
and non-traditional representations if it decides to allow them at all. In this manner,
the state of the client's residence, more often than not, would balance the risks of
this more limited type of Internet legal representation against the potential to more
effectively meet the legal needs of moderate and low income residents.
I. THE GROWTH OF E-LAWYERING
A. The Different Types of E-Lawyering
Attorney conduct on the Internet can occur in four main contexts: in chat rooms,
on bulletin boards, through a law firm Web site, or through e-mail communications.
In some electronic representations of a client, an attorney might even engage in a com-
bination of these activities. Activity in an Internet chat room or on an Internet bulletin
board involves a potential client posting a question seeking advice on a particular
legal topic and then receiving responses in subsequent posts from other individuals
who have registered with the Web site.23 After receiving a response, the person making
the initial post then can respond to questions presented in the subsequent posts or ask
for clarification of information that others have provided. On some sites, such as on
22 See infra Part VI.B. 1.
23 See, e.g., Free Advice, http://www.freeadvice.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2006); see also
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) (describing a chat room exchange between an
individual seeking advice on immigration law and a responsive post from an attorney); Lanctot,
supra note 12, at 152-53 (describing Web sites with bulletin boards that "encourage lay-
people to post legal questions, identifying their state of residence, and suggest that lawyers
who are licensed to practice in those states post responses"); Brad Hunt, Comment, Lawyers
in Cyberspace: Legal Malpractice on ComputerBulletin Boards, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553,
554 ("Legal bulletin boards are notice boards in cyberspace where people discuss legal issues
and ask and answer questions about the law."). Some examples from FreeAdvice.com of the
particular legal topics into which a bulletin board may be divided include "Accident and
Injury Law," "Consumer & General Practice Law," "Family Law," and "Real Estate Law."
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FreeAdvice.com, the person making the initial legal inquiry is required to indicate
the jurisdiction in which they are located.24 Some Web sites providing chat rooms or
bulletin boards are free to visitors of the site, while others charge a fee to users of the
site.25 Often such sites provide other services such as a directory of attorneys in a par-
ticular area.26
The difference between an Internet chat room and an Internet bulletin board is that
the communications in the chat room occur in real time. Thus, the posts in a chat room
occur very rapidly, one after another. On an Internet bulletin board, posts occur more
slowly over several hours or even days. Therefore, the amount of time in which an
attorney would have to consider a potential client's post and then form and post an
answer to a request for legal information would be much quicker in a chat room than
on an Internet bulletin board.
In addition to communicating with potential clients in chat rooms or bulletin
boards, some attorneys are engaging in electronic lawyering in a more formal manner
by allowing clients to communicate with an attorney through a particular part of the
firm's Web site or filling out a potential client intake form on the firm Web site or a
Web site run by a third party.27 Some Web sites allow clients to fill out their own legal
forms in a "decision-tree format" and then have an attorney review the documents
before the clients receive the documents. 28 Other sites allow clients to question attor-
neys on discrete questions for a flat fee.29
24 FreeAdvice.com, http://www.freeadvice.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
25 See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316, at n.3 (describing one "multi-purpose site"
offering real time chats with attorneys for fifteen dollars for a single chat or an annual sub-
scription to the chat room for thirty dollars per month and another Web site that "charged $10
for a one-week subscription"); Darren Franklin, Hanging a Shingle on the Information Super-
highway: Legal Advice on the Internet and Problems of Prohibited Client Solicitation and
UnintendedAttomey-Client Relationships, 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 2, 4, http://stlr.stanford
.edu/STLR/Articles/0STLR_2/index.htm (describing USLaw.com, which "offers a $9.95
single-use ($24.95 annual subscription) 'Ask a Lawyer' feature that lets users have 'private
one-on-one live chats with licensed lawyers"').
26 See, e.g., Lawyers.com, http://www.lawyers.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2006); Legal
Match.com, http://www.legalmatch.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
27 See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof 1 Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op.
2005-168 (2005) (describing a hypothetical firm Web site that allows prospective clients to
make their initial inquiry to the firm by filling out an electronic form asking for the inquirer's
name and contact information as well as a short description of his or her legal problem and any
initial questions the inquirer has). The client intake forms available on Web sites can range
from a one-page form asking for very basic information, to several screens that ask for, among
other things, a detailed description of the client's situation and needs. Compare New Jersey
Real Estate & Bankruptcy Lawyers, http://www.njdebtrelief.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2006),
with LegalMatch.com, http://www.legalmatch.com (click "Present Your Case") (last visited
Sept. 13, 2006).
28 Terry Carter, Law Tech Generations: Newer Versions of Firm Web Sites Boldly Go Where
Few Law Firms Have Gone Before, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2004, at 22.
29 See Franklin, supra note 25, 9U 5-6 (describing "[http://]www.legalopinion.con, where
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Furthermore, some attorneys are engaging in more traditional practices where the
attorney provides a fuller array of legal services but all of the communications with
a client occur through the firm Web site or through e-mail.3° Some attorneys are find-
ing that such practices are more efficient and also allow them to find new clients with-
out having to battle for clients in a more limited and immediate geographic area.3
However, engaging in such representations increases the likelihood that the client
will be located in a different jurisdiction and have a legal question pertaining to the
law of that particular jurisdiction rather than the law of the jurisdiction in which the
attorney is located and licensed.32
B. Demand for E-Lawyering
The demand for legal services delivered over the Internet springs from the great,
unmet need for legal representation of poor and moderate income Americans. As far
as citizens of little means are concerned, legal services offices are only able to address
"less than a fifth of the needs of eligible clients."33 Of the poor who are able to obtain
legal assistance through such offices, many "must wait over two years before seeing
a lawyer for matters like divorce," which do not qualify as emergencies. 34 Furthermore,
visitors can get legal advice for $39.95 a question" and "the LegalEase Home Page," which
"charges visitors $25 to answer their immigration law questions").
30 See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 00-4 (2000) (allowing attorneys "to
provide limited, on-line legal services to Florida residents on simple matters not requiring
office visits or court appearances" such as "simple wills, incorporation papers, real estate con-
tracts, residential leases and uncontested marital agreements... as long as the attorney complies
with the ethics rules"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) (finding
that "using the Internet to take orders for trademark searches, conduct trademark searches,
render legal opinions and file trademark applications is analogous to conducting a law practice
by telephone or facsimile machine and is likewise permissible, subject to the same restric-
tions applicable to communication by those means"); Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Op. 1791 (2003) (allowing an attorney to engage in a bankruptcy practice in which
he would communicate with clients without any face-to-face meetings but "via electronic
communication so long as the content and caliber of those services otherwise comport with
the duties and competence and communication").
"' See Carter, supra note 6, at 35 (discussing an attorney who screens potential clients
through e-mail, "which has added the value of being more efficient than fielding phone calls");
Hornsby, supra note 5, at 13, 16 (stating that providing "on-line advice overcomes geographic
obstacles and provides a convenient alternative to a face-to-face encounter" and that "using
a digital strategy to expand the geographic area would allow the lawyer access to a larger
volume of unbundled cases without consuming a larger percentage of the marketplace for the
immediate jurisdiction").
32 Hunt, supra note 23, at 556 ("[L]awyers in cyberspace will probably receive many
questions from people who live in states (or even nations, given the international nature of
cyberspace) other than those in which they are licensed to practice law.").
13 RHODE, supra note 10, at 13.
34 Id.
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such services are not available at all for many people "just over the poverty line" who
cannot afford an attorney but who do not meet income eligibility requirements. 5
With regard to the middle class, one survey indicated that less than half of moder-
ate income households with a legal need actually consulted an attorney.3 6 According
to the same survey, less than forty percent of moderate income households used the
courts to address their legal problems.37 Almost a quarter of the households surveyed
handled the problem on their own while a little over a quarter took no action at all.38
Moreover, "[tiwo-thirds of surveyed Americans agree[d] that it [was] 'not affordable
to bring a case in court.' ' 39 Another survey conducted in Maryland indicated that
almost three-quarters of the people in the middle class "no longer contact[ed] an attor-
ney when faced with a legal problem." 4
The lack of affordability of legal counsel has resulted in a large increase in the
number of people filing cases pro se.4 ' Especially in the areas of housing, bankruptcy,
and family law, as well as in small claims court, more people than not handle their
lawsuits without using an attorney.41 "In some jurisdictions, over four-fifths of these
matters involve self-represented 'pro se' litigants." '43 This increase in self-representation
further enhances individuals' dissatisfaction with the legal system. Only approximately
one-half of people of middle income were happy with the result when they handled
35 Id.
" Hornsby, supra note 5, at 2 (citing the results of a 1992 survey conducted by the ABA
indicating that forty-three percent of moderate income households with a legal need consulted
an attorney); see also RHODE, supra note 10, at 79 (citing the same survey and stating that
"about two-thirds of the civil legal needs of moderate-income consumers were not taken to
lawyers or the judicial system").
37 Hornsby, supra note 5, at 2; see also MODESTMEANS TASK FORCE, AM. B. ASS'N SEC.
OF LmG., HANDBOOK ON LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL ASSISTANCE 8 (2003) [hereinafter MODEST
MEANS TASK FORCE] (referring to an ABA study finding that "7 out of 10 low-income house-
holds and 6 out of 10 moderate-income households that had legal problems did not use our
legal system to resolve them").
" Hornsby, supra note 5, at 2 (citing an ABA survey indicating that twenty-three percent
of households surveyed dealt with the legal problem on their own and twenty-six percent of
households took no action at all).
39 RHODE, supra note 10, at 80; see also Cristina L. Underwood, Comment, Balancing
Consumer Interests in a DigitalAge: A NewApproach to Regulating the Unauthorized Practice
of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437,442 (2004) ("Many low[] and moderate-income households
simply cannot afford the cost of personal legal services.").
40 RHODE, supra note 10, at 79.
", See Hornsby, supra note 5, at 3 (citing a Maryland study that found that "57 percent
of pro se litigants [in Maryland] proceeded pro se because they could not afford a lawyer").
42 RHODE, supra note 10, at 14. Between sixty-five percent and ninety percent of uncon-
tested divorces involve at least one pro se party. Id. at 82; see also MODEST MEANS TASKFORCE,
supra note 37, at 6 (stating that "[n]ationally, in three or four out of every five [domestic
relations] cases, one of the two parties is unrepresented" and that "both parties are unrepresented
in two or three out of every five cases").
4' RHODE, supra note 10, at 14.
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their legal problems on their own, and only one-third of the individuals who took
no action were pleased with the result.' This contrasts with the two-thirds of people
satisfied with the outcome among those who consulted attorneys to deal with their
legal problems.45
One effort to address the unmet legal needs of so many Americans has been to
develop technological solutions.' The use of Internet representations is one way in
which technology can help middle and low income individuals obtain some degree of
legal advice instead of addressing their legal problems wholly on their own.47 Many
types of e-lawyering that currently exist represent part of a larger attempt to serve
unmet legal needs by "unbundling" legal services.48 Under such arrangements, an
attorney agrees with a client to complete discrete legal tasks rather than carrying out
a whole case from beginning to end.49 The idea is that many people who now proceed
44 Id. at 80; see also MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 12 n.30 (referring to
an Oregon survey indicating that about seventy-five percent of people with a legal need who
did not retain counsel were "dissatisfied with the outcome of the case").
" RHODE, supra note 10, at 80.
46 See HENRY H. PERRrrr, JR., How TO PRACiCE LAW wrrH COMPuTERS 59 (3d ed. 1998)
(noting that the lack of affordability of legal services by middle-class Americans has created
the potential "for deploying computer technology creatively to define entirely new legal services
products for ordinary citizens").
4' See D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) ("Advocates of the provision of
low-cost legal advice through on-line chat rooms and similar innovative services make the
important point that these services offer great potential for providing low-cost legal services
to low and moderate income persons."); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 250 (stating that providing
legal advice over the Internet "has the potential to serve the unmet legal needs of millions of
Americans of low and moderate income who cannot afford to hire attorneys, at a time when the
number of lawyers in the United States continues to expand"); Hunt, supra note 23, at 555
("Legal information is also considerably less expensive when obtained in cyberspace rather
than in person.").
48 See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 253 (stating that "[imn many ways, giving specific legal
advice to clients online, while expressly disclaiming any additional responsibilities, is a classic
example of discrete task representation" and that "[b]y unbundling these services, the lawyer
can give at least limited assistance to the person who needs help.., and the client can obtain
recourse that he otherwise could not obtain").
49 See MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 2 (describing "limited scope legal
assistance" as "a designated service or services, rather than the full package of traditionally
offered services"); RHODE, supra note 10, at 100 (describing unbundling of legal services as
where "a lawyer and client agree to limit representation to discrete, specified tasks"); Lanctot,
supra note 12, at 253 ("The model is that of a menu of legal tasks from which the client, in
consultation with the lawyer, is permitted to purchase only the services that he needs or can
afford."); Hansen, supra note 10, at 72 (describing unbundling of legal services as a "lawyer
contract[ing] to perform specific, limited work for the client without taking on responsibility
for the entire case").
Several other terms are used to describe this type of representation including "'discrete
task' representation, 'limited scope assistance', orjust 'limited assistance' or 'limited represen-
tation."' MODESTMEANSTASKFORCE, supra note 37, at 3. "Common forms of unbundled [legal
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pro se, or opt out of the legal system altogether, would be able to afford and would use
reasonably priced limited representations if this were an option.50 The ABA recently
modified the Model Rules to better allow for such discrete task representations,' and
more and more state disciplinary authorities are formally approving such represen-
tations.52 Therefore, providing limited legal advice to clients over the Internet poten-
tially could become an important part of the effort to satisfy unmet legal needs through
the unbundled or discrete task representation model.
C. Formation of Attorney-Client Relationship Through E-Lawyering
When attorneys interact over the Internet in a more limited manner with po-
tential clients, such as in an Internet chat room or on a bulletin board, the issue arises
of when the interaction between the attorney and the potential client forms an actual
services] involve court appearances or trial representation; telephone, Internet, or brief in-
person advice; and assistance with negotiations, pretrial discovery, or document preparation."
RHODE, supra note 10, at 100.
'0 MODESTMEANS TASKFORCE, supra note 37, at 7, 9 (stating that "[mianypro se litigants
have enough disposable income to pay for the limited representation they need" and that "[miany
of those who opt out, or who are forced out, of the legal system would use the legal system to
resolve their disputes, and retain lawyers to represent them, if lawyers offered them reasonable
limited-service options"). "Limited representation, therefore, is an important means to provide
people with access to justice." Id. at 9.
5' MODELRULES OF PROF'LCONDucT R. 1.2(c) (2002) (stating that a "lawyer may limit
the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and
the client gives informed consent"); AM. B. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EvALu-
ATION OF THE RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT 145 (2000) (stating that the intent of revis-
ing Rule 1.2(c) was "to provide a framework within which lawyers may expand access to legal
services by providing limited but nonetheless valuable legal service to low or moderate-income
persons who otherwise would be unable to obtain counsel"). Moreover, many of the ethics
opinions dealing with unbundled legal services "identify Model Rule 1.2 as the source of author-
ity for limited-service agreements." MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 84.
" See, e.g., Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof 1 Conduct, Op. 05-06 (2005) (approving "limited
scope representation" as long as certain conditions are met); Colo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm.,
Formal Op. 101 (1998) (allowing an attorney to provide "unbundled legal services in both
litigation and non-litigation matters" as long as the attorney can "make a sufficient inquiry into
and analysis of' the applicable law and facts); Tenn. Board of Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op.
2005-F-151 (2005) (acknowledging that Rule 1.2(c) "allows a lawyer to limit the scope of a
client's representation if the client consents and if the limitation is reasonable under the
circumstances" and approving a pro se clinic where attorneys provide "limited advice and
assistance without becoming counsel of record" to domestic relations litigants); see also MODEST
MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 114-20, 124-27 (describing how Colorado, Maine, and
Washington have revised their ethics rules to facilitate the provision of unbundled legal ser-
vices); Hansen, supra note 10, at 72 (noting that "since 2000, six states [California, Colorado,
Florida, Maine, Washington, and Wyoming] have formally adopted various changes in their
ethics codes or civil procedure rules to accommodate unbundling and assisted pro se repre-
sentation. And... at least 11 other states have begun to study the issue actively.").
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attorney-client relationship. This is important because if an attorney-client relation-
ship is not formed, several of the ethical obligations owed to a client will not apply.
53
Consequently, onejurisdiction' s ethics opinion on electronic representations advises
attorneys to post disclaimers stating that an attorney-client relationship is not created
through the activity on the Web site concerned.54 However, Professor Catherine
Lanctot has concluded that such disclaimers will be ineffective if the subsequent
activity of the attorney and client indicates that the parties actually have formed an
attorney-client relationship.55
Moreover, Professor Lanctot concludes that much of the activity that occurs
between attorneys and clients in chat rooms and bulletin boards would be sufficient
to form an attorney-client relationship. 56 Generally, an attorney-client relationship
arises when: (1) an individual manifests an intent for an attorney to provide legal
services to them; and (2) that attorney either (a) manifests to the individual an intent
to provide the legal services or (b) the attorney "fails to manifest a lack of consent" to
provide the legal services to the individual when the attorney knows, or under the
circumstances reasonably should know, that the individual "reasonably relies on the
lawyer to provide the services.,,
57
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 introductory note
(2000) ("A fundamental distinction is involved between clients, to whom lawyers owe many
duties, and nonclients, to whom lawyers owe few duties.... Prospective and former clients
receive certain protections, but not all of those due to clients.").
51 See D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 302 (2000) (suggesting the use of "disclaimers ... on
'click through' boxes or pages, which require visitors to verify that they have read important
information by clicking on a specified area of the screen before proceeding" in an opinion
addressing an Internet Web site seeking plaintiffs for class action lawsuits).
55 Lanctot, supra note 12, at 193 ("I expect that neither courts nor bar disciplinary author-
ities are likely to be sympathetic to cyberspace attorneys who rely on disclaimers as all-purpose
shields. In my view, if the legal advice given is specifically tailored to the factual circum-
stances presented, that conduct will suffice to create an attorney-client relationship, regardless
of what boilerplate disclaimers the lawyer attaches to the advice.").
Professor Lanctot goes on, however, to conclude that disclaimers might be effective in
limiting the scope of an electronic representation. Id. at 195 ("[A] disclaimer that limited the
online lawyer's obligations to providing a competent legal response, without further requiring
the lawyer to take steps to protect the client's interest, arguably could be consistent with [the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers], if the circumstances of the exchange reflected informed consent."). Nevertheless,
"there are core attributes of the attorney-client relationship, such as basic competency, that
cannot be bargained away." Id.; see also MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 6
(stating that "lawyers owe the same duties of loyalty, confidentiality, diligence, and compe-
tence to limited-service clients that they do to full-service clients").
56 See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 184 ("In short, lawyers who provide specific legal advice
online may find it difficult at some future point to persuade a court or bar counsel that they
did not intend to incur any professional obligations by answering questions in cyberspace.").
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS § 14 (2000); see also Lanctot,
supra note 12, at 168-69 (setting out and explaining the Restatement test for formation of an
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Much of the activity on Internet chat rooms and bulletin boards likely will form
an attorney relationship in the following manner. First, the site user posts a legal
question manifesting an intent to have a lawyer perform legal services, specifically
by asking for legal advice and a recommendation on a course of action given the facts
of the poster's situation.58 Second, an attorney manifests his or her intent to perform
the requested legal services by actual performance, particularly by providing specific
legal advice in response to the original user's post.5 9 Alternatively, an attorney could
form an attorney-client relationship by posting a reply to the original site user's post
knowing that the user will rely on the legal advice provided. 6° Thus, as long as the
attorney is providing legal advice specifically tailored to the user's situation, an
attorney-client relationship will be formed.6' Moreover, even if an attorney limits
the objectives in the representation, this does not do away with the obligations that
an attorney owes a client with regard to those specific objectives.62
attorney-client relationship).
58 Lanctot, supra note 12, at 169 ("[T]he online posting of a specific legal question by a
layperson manifests the intent to have a lawyer perform legal services-specifically, to provide
legal advice.").
59 Id. ("The lawyer can also manifest consent by performance-that is, by providing the
requested legal advice.").
o Id. at 169-70 ("[Flurnishing specific legal advice in response to the question, without
more, can constitute consent regardless of the lawyer's subjective intent" because the attorney
can "still incur the obligations of a professional relationship if the lawyer knows or reason-
ably should know that the questioner is reasonably relying on the lawyer's advice"); see also
Franklin, supra note 25, 14 ("An attorney-client relationship, therefore, does not require
an explicit agreement; it may arise by implication from a Web site visitor's reasonable expec-
tation of legal representation and the online attorney's failure to dispel those expectations.").
61 Lanctot, supra note 12, at 183 ("[G]iving specific legal advice in response to a set of par-
ticular facts is the hallmark of the practice of law, while providing general information about
the law is not. Second, it is reasonable for a putative client to rely on advice that is specifically
tailored to his [or her] particular request, and the courts are clear that it is the reasonable belief
of the client that will govern."); see also Ill. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Conduct, Op.
96-10 (1997) ("[L]awyers participating in chat groups or other on-line services that could
involve offering personalized legal advice to anyone who happens to be connected to the ser-
vice should be mindful that the recipients of such advise [sic] are the lawyer's clients, with the
benefits and burdens of that relationship."); Or. State Bar Ass'n Board of Governors, Formal
Op. 1991-101 (1991) ("In essence, the practice of law involves the application of a general
body of legal knowledge to the problem of a specific entity or individual."); Underwood,
supra note 39, at 450-52,462-63 (2004) (describing the test that the majority of state courts
use to determine whether the practice of law has occurred as examining whether the advice
provided is tailored to the specific circumstances of the consumer).
62 See MODEST MEANS TASK FORCE, supra note 37, at 6 (stating that "lawyers owe the
same duties of loyalty, confidentiality, diligence, and competence to limited-service clients
that they do to full-service clients"); Hansen, supra note 10, at 72 (stating that in the larger
context of unbundled legal services generally "[m]any of the [ethics] opinions also agree that
an attorney-client relationship still exists when legal services are provided on a limited basis").
But see MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (2002) ("Although an agreement
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Even if an attorney-client relationship is not formed, an attorney may still owe
certain duties of confidentiality and loyalty to prospective clients. With regard to infor-
mation learned from a prospective client in the initial consultation, Model Rule 1.18
states that an attorney owes a prospective client the same duty of confidentiality owed
to former clients.63 The attorney also cannot represent someone with materially adverse
interests to the prospective client in "the same or a substantially related matter" if the
attorney received "significantly harmful" information from the prospective client.'
The rule further imputes this disqualification to other members of the attorney's firm.65
An attorney's firm can avoid disqualification if the attorney "took reasonable measures
to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary
to determine whether to represent the prospective client," the attorney is appropriately
screened, the attorney receives no part of the fee from the matter, and the prospective
client receives written notice. 66 Disqualification alternatively can be avoided if the
attorney receives written "informed consent" from both parties concerned.67 Comment
5 to the rule further states that an attorney can avoid disqualification if the attorney
expressly conditions discussions with the prospective client upon that individual's
"informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit
the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. '68 An attorney can avoid
for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent
representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowl-
edge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.").
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(b) (2002) ("Even when no client-lawyer
relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use
or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect
to information of a former client."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHELAw GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 15(l)(a) (2000) (stating that when an attorney has discussions with a prospective
client about "the possibility of their forming a client-lawyer relationship for a hatter and no such
relationship ensues," the attorney must "not subsequently use or disclose confidential infor-
mation learned in the consultation, except to the extent permitted with respect to confidential
information of a client or former client").
Model Rule 1.18 defines a "prospective client" as a "person who discusses with a lawyer
the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 1.18(a) (2002). Comment 2 to the rule goes on to state that
someone "who communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable
expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer
relationship, is not a 'prospective client."' Id. R. 1.18 cmt. 2.
6' Id. R. 1.18(c).
65 id.
' Id. R. 1.18(d)(2); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
15(2)(a) (2000) (stating that an attorney's firm may avoid disqualification due to contact with
a prospective client if the "personally prohibited lawyer takes reasonable steps to avoid
exposure to confidential information other than information appropriate to determine whether
to represent the prospective client," and the firm properly screens the attorney).
67 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(d)(1) (2002).
6' Id. R.. 1.8cmt. 5.
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the duty of confidentiality if the client expressly agrees to the attorney's "subsequent
use of information received from the prospective client."'69
Therefore, when an attorney has contact with an individual seeking legal advice
over the Internet, he or she potentially can avoid incurring the obligations owed to pro-
spective clients in one of two ways. First, the attorney can make sure that he or she
initially learns only enough information to engage in a proper conflicts check regarding
the matter. Such information could be restricted to the potential party names, any other
significant actors concerned in the matter, and the general subject matter of the repre-
sentation.70 Presumably, this will decrease the chance that the attorney will receive
"significantly harmful" information before discovering that a conflict with a current
or previous client exists.
7
'
Second, the attorney could have the prospective client expressly consent to waive
the obligations that Model Rule 1.18 imposes. On an intake form on a firm Web site,
this could be accomplished by requiring the prospective client to click on a button
directly under language waiving these obligations before the individual's information
would be transmitted to the law firm. 72 However, language simply disclaiming any
"attorney-client relationship" or "confidential relationship" may be insufficient to
do away with the Rule 1.18 obligations.73 Instead, one state's ethics committee has
stated that, to be effective, a waiver must be written in "plain-language" and expressly
state that "the [attorney] will have no duty to keep confidential the information" trans-
mitted by the prospective client.74 Therefore, unless an attorney acts proactively to
69 id.
70 See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof 1 Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op.
2005-168 (2005) (stating that when a prospective client contacted an attorney through an
intake form on the firm's Web site about a potential divorce representation, the attorney would
need to know information such as "the names of the parties, children, [and] former spouses"
in order to perform'a proper conflicts check).
71 See MODELRuTES OFPROF'LCONDUCrR. 1.18 cmt. 4 (2002) ("In order to avoid acquir-
ing disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether or not
to undertake a new matter should limit the initial interview to only such information as reason-
ably appears necessary for that purpose.").
72 See Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof 1 Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op.
2005-168 (2005) (providing an example of some waiver language on an Internet client
intake form).
71 See id. ("We do not believe that a prospective client's agreement to Law Firm's terms
prevented a duty of confidentiality from arising on the facts before us, because Law Firm's dis-
closures to [the prospective client] were not adequate to defeat her reasonable belief that she
was consulting Law Firm for the purpose of retaining Law Firm."); see also Barton v. U.S. Dist.
Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1104, 1107, 1109-12 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
attorney-client privilege applied to information submitted through an Internet questionnaire
seeking information on potential members of a class action despite a disclaimer stating that
filling out the questionnaire did "not constitute a request for legal advice and [the person filling
out the form was] not forming an attorney-client relationship by submitting this information").
74 Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2005-168
(2005).
(Vol. 15:587
2006] E-LAWYERING, THE ABA & THE DORMANT COMMERE CLAUSE 603
either limit the amount of information received or to have the individual seeking legal
advice waive such obligations under express and plain language, an attorney that has
contact with an individual seeking legal advice through the Internet at a minimum
would incur the duties owed to prospective clients, irrespective of whether an actual
attorney-client relationship is formed. Moreover, it may be difficult for an attorney to
implement either method discussed above in the context of an Internet chat room or
bulletin board. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the analysis in the rest of this Article,
I will assume that an attorney-client relationship is formed by the Internet activity of
the attorney and potential client concerned.
In deciding whether to allow legal representations to occur through the Internet,
disciplinary authorities must wrestle with the following issues: (1) whether the initial
communications between the parties constitute an improper solicitation by an attorney
of a potential client;7" (2) whether the attorney can conduct a proper conflicts check
" Compare Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof I Conduct, Op. 97-04 (1997) ("Communi-
cation with a potential client via cyberspace should not be considered either a prohibited tele-
phone or in-person contact because there is not the same element of confrontation/immediacy
as with the prohibited mediums. A potential client reading his or her e-mail, or even partici-
pating in a 'chat room' has the option of not responding to unwanted solicitations."); D.C.
Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 3 16 ("The potentially greater immediacy of 'real time' communications
in chat rooms, as opposed to other forms of written communications, may give rise to
concerns similar to those about 'in person solicitation in circumstances or through means that
are not conducive to intelligent, rational decisions,' D.C. Rule 7.1, comment [5].... On the
other hand, attorney communications with potential clients in chat rooms are probably less
potentially coercive than face-to-face communications."); Ill. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Prof 1 Conduct, Op. 96-10 (1997) ("On the other hand, lawyer participation in an electronic
bulletin board, chat group, or similar service, may implicate Rule 7.3, which governs solici-
tation, the direct contact with prospective clients. The Committee does not believe that merely
posting general comments on a bulletin board or chat group considered solicitation."); and
Phila. Bar Ass'n Prof 1 Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (1998) ("In the opiidiffdf the Committee,
conversation interactions with persons on the Internet do not constitute improper solicitation,
but in any one particular case the interaction may evolve in such a way that it could be charac-
terized as such."), with Fla. Bar Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. A-00-1 (2000) (prohibiting "an
attorney's participation in a chat room in order to solicit professional employment" as an in-
person solicitation); Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-276 (1996)
("[Ilf a lawyer is participating in interactive communication on the Internet, carrying on an
immediate electronic conversation. If the communication was initiated by the lawyer without
invitation, such 'real time' communications about the lawyer's services would be analogous
to direct solicitation, outside the activity permitted by MRPC 7.3."); Utah State Bar Ethics
Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (1997) (finding "that an attorney's advertising and
solicitation through a chat group are 'in person' communications under Rule 7.3(a) and are
accordingly restricted by the provisions of that rule" although finding that postings to "news-
groups" are "analogous to placing an advertisement for legal services in a narrow-interest
magazine or newspaper" and are allowable); and W. Va. Lawyer Disciplinary Board, Op.
98-03 (1998) (finding "that solicitations via real time communications on the computer, such
as a chat room, should be treated similar to [prohibited] telephone and in-person solicitations").
For a discussion of how state legal ethics rules on advertising and solicitation, as well as other
state statutes, apply to lawyers who send unsolicited e-mail (otherwise known as "spam") to
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before the attorney enters into the representation;76 (3) if the communications occur
in a forum open to the public, whether the attorney can adequately protect client con-
fidences or alternatively, whether the client can waive his or her right to confidentiality
in an informed manner, or at all, in this setting;7 7 and (4) whether an attorney can com-
petently represent a client in this manner.78 If, after grappling with these concerns,
potential clients, see generally William E. Hornsby, Jr., Spamming for Legal Services: A
Constitutional Right Within a Regulatory Quagmire, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 97 (2003).
76 See Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Op. 97-04 (stating that attorneys prob-
ably should not respond to specific legal questions posted in "chat rooms" or "news groups"
because, in part, of "the inability to screen for a potential conflict with an existing client (in
violation of ER 1.7)"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 709 (1998) ("Prac-
ticing law for clients by means of the Internet does not give rise to any exemption from this
fundamental obligation to avoid conflicts and not to undertake a new. representation without
checking to assure that it does not create an impermissible conflict."); Ohio Board of Comm'rs
on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999) ("As an attorney checks for conflicts when
a client calls or comes to his office seeking legal services, an attorney must check for con-
flicts when a client e-mails seeking legal advice. The on-line intake form should provide a
way for the law firm to make a conflicts check prior to reviewing the legal question."); Phila. Bar
Ass'n Prof'l Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (stating that "in the course of an interaction with
any person on the Internet an attorney/client relationship may begin with all that such a
relationship implies including creation of potential conflicts of interest (see Rules 1.7 and
1.9)"); S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 94-27 (stating that in an electronic representation
the "attorney must obtain sufficient information to identify his client in order to make a com-
plete conflicts inquiry"); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (stating
that an attorney advertising and communicating over the Internet "may be unable to screen
for potential conflicts as required by Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.10").
71 See Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 97-04 (1997) (stating that attor-
neys probably should not respond to specific legal questions posted in "chat rooms" or "news
groups" because, in part, of "the possibility of disclosing confidential information (in violation
of ER 1.6"); D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) (stating that an attorney engaging in an
electronic representation of a client "must also safeguard the secrets and confidences of that
client under Rule 1.6," which may require the attorney "eyen if a communication begins as a
public communication in a chat room or similar exchange service.., to reserve his or her com-
munications for the eyes of a particular advice seeker only"); Ohio Board of Commissioners
on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999) (stating that in a legal representation through
e-mail the "confidences and secrets of the e-mail clients must be protected under DR 4-101");
Phila. Bar Association Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 98-6 (1998) (stating that "in the
course of an interaction with any person on the Internet an attorney/client relationship may
begin," which would include "expectations of confidentiality"); S.C. Ethics Advisory Comm.,
Op. 94-27 (1994) (stating that "the confidentiality requirements of Rule 1.6 are implicated
by any confidential communication which occurs across electronic media, absent an express
waiver by the client"); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Op. 97-10 (1997)
(stating that in communicating with a client or prospective client over the Internet "it may
be difficult to protect confidential communications under Rules 1.6 and 1.9").
78 D.C. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 316 (2002) (stating that in an electronic representation of
a client, an "attorney must ensure that such requirements as that of competence under D.C. Rule
1.1, diligence and zeal under Rule 1.3, and adequate communication under Rule 1.4 are met");
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a jurisdiction decides to allow electronic representations, the jurisdiction must decide
what precautions to require an attorney to take to address these issues and protect
consumers in the best manner possible. Furthermore, it is very possible that differ-
ent jurisdictions will decide to protect clients in different manners and place varied
requirements on attorneys who engage in electronic representations of clients.79
II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF CHOICE OF LEGAL ETHICS LAW BY MODEL CODE
AND MODEL RULES
The ABA' s model ethics rules have gone from not addressing choice of ethics
law at all, to basing the choice of ethics law on the jurisdiction or jurisdictions where
an attorney is licensed, to basing the choice of ethics law on where the attorney's con-
duct occurred or where the predominant effect of the attorney's conduct arises.80 The
following section discusses the history of the ABA's treatment of choice of ethics
law in attorney disciplinary actions, or lack thereof, first in the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Conduct ("Model Code") and then in subsequent versions of the Model
Rules. This history should help a reader appreciate why there is little case or admin-
istrative law discussing this issue and should illuminate the current language of the
Model Rule's choice of law rule.
A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Original 1983 Version of
Model Rule 8.5
The Model Code, which the ABA adopted in 1969,' ignored inter-jurisdictional
conflicts of ethics law and did not contain a rule addressing choice of ethics law.82 This
Ohio Board of Comm'rs on Grievances and Discipline, Op. 99-9 (1999) ("In providing
answers to e-mail questions a lawyer must act competently under DR 6-10 'f(A)."); Va. State
Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1791 (2003) (stating that with regard to a legal
representation in which an attorney communicates with a client by e-mail without in-person
meetings, "[s]o long as the requisite infornation is given, received, analyzed and acted upon,
the attorney has met his duty of competency"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (stating that brief consultation with a client before rendering legal advice
may be appropriate unless "the time allotted was not sufficient to yield advice upon which
the client could rely"); Lanctot, supra note 12, at 252-53 (exploring whether a lawyer can
meet his or her duty of diligence under Model Rule 1.3 "when a lawyer gives a client specific
legal advice, but does not volunteer additional information about other legal issues that might
lurk beneath the surface").
71 See J.T. Westermeier, Ethics and the Internet, 17 GEO. J. LEGALETHICs 267,311 (2004)
(stating that "[t]he variances among states and countries in ethical rules applicable to [W]ebsites
and electronic communications greatly complicates any analysis of ethical considerations" and
that "there is little likelihood that uniformity on a multi-jurisdictional basis could be achieved").
80 See infra notes 81-116 and accompanying text.
I! 1GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WLiAM HODES, THE LAWOFLAWYERING § 1.11, at
1-19 (3d ed. 2003). Although adopted in 1969, the Model Code was not effective until 1970. Id.
82 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY: A
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omission was understandable because conflicts among state ethical rules were minimal
during the period of time in which the Model Code served as the basis for most states'
regulation of attorney conduct.8 3 Soon after the ABA adopted the Model Code, forty-
nine states had adopted or taken significant steps toward adopting the Model Code in
substantial part." Therefore, with considerable continuity existing between states'
ethical rules during this time, choice of ethics law was not a significant issue.15
The original 1983 version of the Model Rules also largely ignored choice of law
issues.8 6 Model Rule 8.5, entitled "Jurisdiction," simply dealt with a state's disci-
plinary jurisdiction and stated: "A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction although engaged in practice
STUDENT'S GUIDE 2005-2006, at 1108 (2005) (noting that the Model Code had no counter-
part to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5).
83 See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 1.11, at 1-19 ("Within a few years, the Code
was officially adopted-by the courts, not merely by the bar associations-in virtually all
American jurisdictions."); Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional
Practice-Is Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV.
715,747 (1995) (stating that "[n]o reason existed to think about amending the Code to address
multijurisdictional conflicts since the professional standards were identical from state to state").
However, while forty-nine states eventually adopted the original version of the Model Code,
many states rejected or adopted substantially different amendments to the Code than those
subsequently recommended by the ABA. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS
56-57 (1986).
' WOLFRAM, supra note 83, at 56-57. Wolfram notes that this number includes states where
the Model Code "had received only unofficial state bar approval." Id. at 56 n.45. "Official
versions of a revised Code were not adopted in Illinois and Maine, for example, until 1980."
Id. Furthermore, some states adopted the Model Code's Disciplinary Rules and not its Ethical
Considerations, while other states adopted the Ethical Considerations "as legally binding and
enforceable norms." HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 1.11, at 1-20; see also WOLFRAM,
supra note 83, at 56 ("Not all states adopted all the parts of the Code. Several states omitted
the Ethical Considerations.").
The Model Code contained three different types of statements: "[B]road general 'axiom-
atic' principles ('Canons'), aspirational and explanatory provisions ('Ethical Considerations,'
referred to as 'ECs'), and black letter rules ('Disciplinary Rules,' referred to as 'DRs')."
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 1.11, at 1-20. Wolfram notes that the Canons embodied
"general concepts from which the Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations derive," the
Disciplinary Rules were "directly prescriptive," and the Ethical Considerations were "'aspira-
tional in character' and "may provide 'interpretive guidance"' for courts or agencies attempting
to construe a Disciplinary Rule. WOLFRAM, supra note 83, at 58-59 (quoting the Preliminary
Statement of the Model Code).
85 See Daly, supra note 83, at 747 (stating that "professional standards were identical from
state to state.... [So] the number of conflict issues brought to the attention of courts, disci-
plinary bodies, and state bar associations was extremely small.").
86 See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 66.4 n. 1, at 66-23 ("As originally promul-
gated in 1983, Model Rule 8.5 did not address the choice of law issue at all, leaving courts and
disciplinary authorities to develop conflicts of law principles on a case-by-case basis.").
[Vol. 15:587
2006] E-LAWYERING, THE ABA & THE DORMANT COMMERE CLAUSE 607
elsewhere."87 Nevertheless, two comments to this version of Rule 8.5 obliquely dealt
with choice of law issues. Comment 2 stated that if rules of professional conduct
in two states differed then "principles of conflicts of law may apply." 88 Comment
3 further stated that where a lawyer "is licensed to practice law in two jurisdictions
which impose conflicting obligations, applicable rules of choice of law may govern
the situation."89 Consequently, Rule 8.5 and its comments were largely silent on
which jurisdiction's ethics law should apply to an attorney admitted to practice in
one state but not admitted to the bar in another state in which the attorney rendered
legal services.9°
B. 1993 Version of Model Rule 8.5
In 1993, the ABA amended Model Rule 8.5."' The title of the rule was changed
to "Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law." Section (b) dealing with choice of law
issues was added93 while section (a) essentially contained the original language of the
rule dealing with disciplinary jurisdiction.' The purpose of section (b) was to sub-
ject any particular instance of attorney conduct to "one set of rules of professional
conduct.""5 This section of the rule divided attorney conduct into that undertaken
"in connection with a proceeding in a court," which was dealt with in subsection
(b)(1), and "any other conduct," which was dealt with in subsection (b)(2).'
87 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (1983).
88 Id. cmt. 2.
89 Id. cmt. 3.
9o See Daly, supra note 83, at 749 (stating that the original version of Model Rule 8.5 "is
strikingly silent about ajurisdiction's right to discipline a lawyer not admitted to the bar who
nonetheless renders legal services within the jurisdiction").
9' 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 66.2, at 66-5; Daly, supra'nd6te 83, at 756.
92 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDUcT R. 8.5 (1993).
" 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 66.2, at 66-5 ("The ABA amended Rule 8.5 in
1993 to add a new section (b) addressing choice of law issues that can arise in lawyer disci-
pline cases.").
94 See MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 8.5 (1993); see also Daly, supra note 83,
at 757 ("Subsection (a) of the new Model Rule 8.5 essentially track[ed] the language of the
prior rule."). In the 1993 version of Rule 8.5, subsection (a) stated:
Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction
is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regardless of
where the lawyer's conduct occurs. A lawyer may be subject to the disci-
plinary authority of both this jurisdiction and anotherjurisdiction where
the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (1993).
9' MODELRUIEs OFPROF'LCONDUCrR. 8.5 cmt. 3 (1993); see also 2 HAZARD & HODES,
supra note 81, § 66.4 n. 1, at 66-23 (stating that the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) was
"designed to ensure that, generally speaking, only a single conduct standard will be applied,
no matter which jurisdiction disciplines a respondent lawyer").
96 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b) (1993).
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
For attorney conduct in a court proceeding, the rule applied "the rules of the juris-
diction in which the court sits." For all attorney conduct outside of court proceedings,
the rule applied the ethical rules of the jurisdiction where the attorney was licensed
to practice if the attorney was admitted in just one jurisdiction.9" If an attorney was
licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction, the rule applied the ethical rules of
the jurisdiction where "the lawyer principally practices." 99 However, if "particular
conduct" of an attorney "clearly [had] its predominant effect in another jurisdiction
in which the lawyer [was] licensed to practice, the [ethics] rules of that jurisdiction"
applied to such conduct."0
The rule did not define the terms "principally practices" or "predominant effect."' '
A comment to the rule did state that the "predominant effect" exception was intend-
ed "to be a narrow one."102 The Comment went on to provide two examples of the
97 Id. R. 8.5(b)(1). This was "unless the rules of the court [provided] otherwise." Id. One
commentator described this portion of the rule as applying the "substance/procedure dis-
tinction" in making choice of law decisions "dealing with litigation conduct." Geoffrey J.
Ritts, Professional Responsibility and the Conflict of Laws, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 17, 87 (1993).
98 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2)(i) (1993).
99 Id. R. 8.5(b)(2)(ii).
100 Id. One commentator has characterized this as a "harmonization" approach to making
choice of law decisions that weighs the interests of the various jurisdictions and parties involved
and attempts to accommodate those interests to the extent possible. Ritts, supra note 97, at
85-87; see also id. at 70 (stating that "'[h]armonization' appears to allow for sensitive case-by-
case analysis of conflicts problems in the ethics area-analysis that can be responsive to the
interests of states as coequal sovereigns in a federal system, and also to the needs of individual
lawyers who may have reasonable fear of being whipsawed between the inconsistent rules
of the states").
In its entirety, the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) stated:
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this juris-
diction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a
lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or for the purposes
of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the juris-
diction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the court provide other-
wise; and
(2) for any other conduct,
(i) if the lawyer is licensed only in this jurisdiction, the rules to be
applied shall be the rules of this jurisdiction, and
(ii) if the lawyer is licensed to practice in this and anotherjurisdiction,
the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in
which the lawyer principally practices; provided, however, that if par-
ticular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in anotherjurisdiction
in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction
shall be applied to that conduct.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b) (1993).
' Daly, supra note 83, at 760 ("Although 'principally practices' and 'predominant effect'
are the central concepts in subsection (b)(2), Model Rule 8.5 fails inexplicably to define them.").
102 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 4 (1993).
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application of that language. The language would apply "to the situation in which
an attorney admitted in, and principally practicing in, State A, but also admitted in
State B, handled an acquisition by a company whose headquarters and operations
were in State B of another, similar such company."' 10 3 However, the language would
not apply "if the lawyer handled an acquisition by a company whose headquarters
and operations were in State A of a company whose headquarters and main oper-
ations were in State A, but which also had some operations in State B."' 4 The
comment did not address more difficult scenarios.
Moreover, neither the language of this version of Rule 8.5 nor its Comment explic-
itly addressed which state's ethics law would apply when ajurisdiction was prosecuting
an attorney for conducting activity in ajurisdiction where the attorney was not admitted
to practice.'0 5 Presumably, in such situations, the law of the jurisdiction where the
attorney was licensed to practice would apply, assuming he or she was licensed in only
one state.i06 But this result seems counterintuitive when the attorney is being prose-
cuted for conduct that occurred in a different state, especially if the conduct concerned
is prohibited in that state but allowed in the licensing state.
Similarly, the rule was unclear as to which state's ethics rules would apply to the
prelitigation conduct of an attorney. The rule applies the ethics rules of the applicable
court once a lawsuit is filed, but the rule is unclear as to whether that court's ethics rules
apply to the attorney's conduct in representing the same client regarding the subject
matter of the ultimate lawsuit prior to filing a complaint.'0 7 Thus, the 1993 version
of Rule 8.5 determined the law applicable to an attorney's conduct largely according
to the jurisdiction in which the attorney was admitted to practice law, but it was fairly
unclear about which jurisdiction's ethics laws applied to out of court conduct when
103 Id.
104 Id.
1o5 See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 66.4, at 66-8 (stating that under the 1993
version of Model Rule 8.5(b) "[o]utside of the litigation context, resolving the choice of
professional responsibility rules is more difficult").
"o See Daynard v. Ness, 178 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D. Mass. 2001) (stating that with regard to
attorneys licensed by only one state, "the choice-of-law analysis is simply that the lawyer is
always subject to the ethical obligations of the state that licensed him, regardless of where the
conduct occurs"); 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 66.4, at 66-8 (stating that in a situation
where an attorney is licensed only in State A and is representing a "client based in State A" in
"a transaction related to property located in State B," according to the 1993 version of Rule 8.5
"the lawyer is governed only by the rules of State A").
107 See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 81, § 66.4, at 66-8 (stating that "Rule 8.5 does not
directly address the issue of prelitigation conduct such as advertising or solicitation"); Daly,
supra note 83, at 759 (noting that subsection (b)(1) of the 1993 version of Rule 8.5 "leaves
unanswered the question [of] which jurisdiction's professional standards apply to the
lawyer's conduct prior to the lawyer's admission" either generally or pro hac vice only for
the purposes of the specific lawsuit concerned). "Subsection (b)(1) also ignores the
possibility that a lawyer will undertake representation 'in connection with a proceeding in
a court' without having been admitted either generally or pro hac vice." Id. at 760.
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an attorney was licensed in more than onejurisdiction. Furthermore, the rule left some-
thing of a gap as to which law applied to an attorney's conduct prior to filing a lawsuit
for a client.
C. 2002 Version of Model Rule 8.5
In August 2002, the ABA adopted amendments to the Model Rules recom-
mended by its Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice."8 Among the amendments
adopted were changes to Model Rule 8.5(b).° 9 The Comment retained the stated pur-
pose of applying "one set of rules of professional conduct" to "any particular conduct
of a lawyer."" 0
The substance of subsection (b)(1), which originally dealt with conduct in court,
stayed the same, applying the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the proceeding con-
cerned takes place, but its language was changed to apply to attorney conduct related
to matters "pending before a tribunal"' "in order to cover alternative dispute resolution
as well as court proceedings. 112 Subsection (b)(2) dealing with "any other conduct" was
changed to apply "the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred,
or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of
that jurisdiction.""' Again, the text of the rule, as well as its Comment, left impor-
tant language undefined, such as "conduct occurred" and "predominant effect."
In an apparent attempt to help fill one of the gaps left by the 1993 version of the
rule, paragraph 4 of the Comment, the rule uses the "predominant effect" language to
address the ethics rules that apply to attorney conduct in representing a client before
a lawsuit is filed or alternative dispute resolution is used. The Comment states that
"[i]n the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a
108 ABA Commiission on Multijurisdictional Practice Statement, http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mjp/home.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2006) ("On August 12, 2002, the American Bar
Association House of Delegates adopted all nine recommendations contained in the Com-
mission's Final Report.").
'09 The ABA also added language to Model Rule 8.5(a) governing disciplinaryjurisdiction
that gives a state explicit authority to discipline attorneys who provide legal services in that
state without a license to practice in that state. This new language provided: "A lawyer not
admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if
the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction." MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2002).
"o Id. R. 8.5 cmt. 3.
nl Id. R. 8.5(b)(1).
112 AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, in 126 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 478
(2003) ("Recognizing the increasing use of alternative dispute-resolution processes, the
Commission has broadened a number of Rules that formerly applied to 'courts' to make them
apply to 'tribunals,' which include binding arbitration and other methods of formally adju-
dicating the rights of parties.").
" MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
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tribunal, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the conduct occurred,
where the tribunal sits or in another jurisdiction."'" 4
Furthermore, a safe harbor provision was added to subsection (b)(2) stating that
a "lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules
of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of
the lawyer's conduct will occur."'" 5 Paragraph 5 of the Comment to the rule explains
that this safe harbor provision is to apply "[w]hen a lawyer's conduct involves signifi-
cant contacts with more than one jurisdiction" and it is not "clear whether the pre-
dominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur in a jurisdiction other than the one
in which the conduct occurred.""' 6 Therefore, under the current version of the Model
Rule, in order to determine the state ethics law to apply to an attorney representing a
client in a jurisdiction where the attorney is not admitted, the new Rule 8.5 looks to
the state where "the lawyer's conduct occurred" or where the conduct's "predominant
effect" arises. However, due to the safe harbor provision, if it is unclear in which
state the "predominant effect" of the attorney's conduct arose, the applicable law is
that of any jurisdiction where the attorney can plausibly argue he or she reasonably
believed the predominant effect occurred.
The current language of the rule leaves it unclear as to which jurisdiction's ethics
rules apply to electronic representations of clients. For example, it is not clear where
an attorney's "conduct occurred" when he or she posts a reply in an Internet chat room,
on an Internet bulletin board, or responds to client e-mails from a computer in Ohio
and the client receives these communications at a computer located in Virginia. The
attomey's conduct could be construed to occur in the attorney's home state, Ohio,
114 Id. R. 8.5 cmt. 4.
"15 Id. R. 8.5(b)(2). In its entirety, the text of the 2002 version of Model Rule 8.5 states:
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in thiujuris-
diction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, regard-
less of where the attorney's conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted in
this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this juris-
diction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal services in
this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority
of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this juris-
diction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the
rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the
tribunal provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct
is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied
to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's
conduct conforms to the rules of ajurisdiction in which the lawyer reason-
ably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur.
Id. R. 8.5.
116 Id. R. 8.5 cmt. 5.
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where he or she has an office because that is where the attorney is located when posting
in the chat room or on the bulletin board or drafting and then sending the e-mail.
Alternatively, the attorney's conduct could be interpreted as occurring in the
client's jurisdiction, Virginia in this example, because that is where the advice pre-
sumably has an effect and where the client acts on the advice. It further seems that if
the client acted upon the attorney's advice in Virginia, Virginia would be where the
"predominant effect" of the attorney's conduct occurred. However, under the safe har-
bor provision in the rule, if the attorney can argue that he or she "reasonably believed"
that the "predominant effect" of the electronic representation was in Ohio, Ohio's ethics
laws would apply. Thus, due to the safe harbor provision, the current version of Model
Rule 8.5(b)(2) may end up, at least in the context of an attorney's electronic repre-
sentation of a client located in a different state, applying the ethics law of the state
where the attorney is licensed, the same result that would have occurred under the
1993 version of the rule.
II. CASE LAW AND ETHICS OPINIONS AIDING IN INTERPRETING THE CURRENT
LANGUAGE OF MODEL RULE 8.5(B)(2)
Only a handful of cases and ethical opinions have interpreted the "principally
practices" and "predominant effect" language from the 1993 version of Model Rule
8.5(b)(2)(ii)." 7 Nevertheless, these cases and opinions indicate that when the attorney
.17 A few other cases have used choice of ethics law rules with almost identical language to
the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i), which applies the ethics rules of the jurisdiction
where the attorney is licensed to practice law if the attorney is licensed in only one juris-
diction. See Philin Corp. v. Westhood, Inc., No. CV-04-1228-HU, 2005 WL 582695, at * 10
(D. Or. Mar. 1.1,-2005) (finding under Oregon choice of ethics law rule that because the attorney
concerned was "apparently admitted only in Oregon," Oregon law applied to a motion to dis-
qualify); Daynard v. Ness, 178 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19 (D. Mass. 2001) ("All five jurisdictions
follow Model Rule 8.5 with respect to the treatment of lawyers licensed by only one state.
For such lawyers, the choice-of-law analysis is simply that the lawyer is always subject to
the ethical obligations of the state that licensed him, regardless of where the conduct occurs.");
O'Brien v. Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group, No. X08CV020190051, 2004 WL 304318, at *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2004) (applying New York's choice of ethics law rule and holding that
New York ethics rules applied to whether an attorney was precluded ethically from prose-
cuting constructive discharge case because it would require the attorney to divulge client
secrets when the attorney was only licensed to practice law in New York during the time
concerned). A couple of cases also have used choice of ethics law rules with almost identical
language to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(1), which applies the ethical "rules of the
jurisdiction in which the court sits" to attorney conduct in court proceedings. See In re
Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Virginia ethics law applied
to the conduct of an attorney "in connection with a proceeding in a Virginia court" in deter-
mining whether the attorney should be disciplined for revealing client secrets); Philin Corp.,
2005 WL 582695, at *9-10 (applying ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the court sits to
the conduct of an attorney in a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon when
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and client reside in different jurisdictions, depending on the facts involved, the
"predominant effect" of an attorney's conduct can be viewed as occurring in either
the jurisdiction where the attorney's office is located or the jurisdiction where the
client resides."'
Only two cases to date have construed the relevant language from the 1993 version
of Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii). The Oregon Supreme Court in In re Complaint as to Conduct
of Summer dealt with whether Idaho or Oregon ethics law applied in a disciplinary pro-
ceeding to the conduct of an attorney licensed to practice in both states. 1 9 The attorney
was convicted in a prior Idaho criminal proceeding of attempting grand theft by de-
ception while representing a client with regard to two separate automobile accidents. 20
The client was involved in an automobile accident in Idaho a little less than two weeks
prior to an Oregon accident. 12 In settling with the insurer of the other driver in the
Idaho accident, the attorney represented that his client had not been injured in the
subsequent Oregon accident. 22 Despite this, the attorney, one week after settling his
client's claim for the Idaho accident, sent a demand letter to the claims adjuster for
the company whose driver was involved in the Oregon accident. 23 In the letter, he
stated that his client did not suffer any symptoms until after the second accident, and
he attached some of the same medical records that he had submitted to the previous
insurer in settling the claim for the Idaho accident.' 24
In deciding which state's ethics rules to apply, the court first found that the attor-
ney "principally practice[d] law in Idaho."'" After becoming a member of the bar
in both Oregon and Idaho, the attorney had "assumed a heavy caseload at a high
volume personal injury law firrn in Nampa, Idaho."' 26 Moreover, in analyzing where
the predominant effect of the attorney's conduct occurred with regard to the Oregon
accident representation, the court noted that while the company whose driver was in-
volved in that accident was "principally an Idaho company, .. . its claims adjuster was
located in Oregon.' 27 Furthermore, the claims adjuster had obtained information about
the accident from the attorney's client in Oregon, and the claims adjusC r in Oregon had
been the first to receive the demand letter from the attorney.128 "It follows, then, that
considering a motion to disqualify the attorney as counsel for the plaintiff).
1l' See infra notes 119-71 and accompanying text.
"9 105 P.3d 848, 849, 851 (Or. 2005).
120 Id. at 850-51.
12 Id. at 850. The opinion does not expressly state whether or not the client was an Oregon
resident, but it appears that the client was a resident of Oregon because Oregon was where
the claims adjuster collected information from the client. Id.
122 id.
123 Id. at 850 & n.4.
124 Id. at 850.
121 Id. at 851.
126 Id. at 850. The attorney's firm, however, maintained an office in Oregon where the attor-
ney occasionally worked. Id. at 850 n.3, 851.
127 Id. at 851.
128 Id. After receiving the demand letter, the claims adjuster forwarded it to the company's
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the effects of the [attorney's] conduct were felt in both Oregon and Idaho. It could be
argued that the [attorney's] acts had approximately equal impact in each jurisdiction."'29
This, presumably, would have called for application of Idaho law because the court
had already determined the attorney principally practiced in Idaho. The "predominant
effect" of his conduct was not "clearly" in Oregon, as required under the 1993 version
of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) in order to apply the law of ajurisdiction other than the one
where the attorney "principally practices." Furthermore, with the attorney's primary
office being located in Idaho and the party who the attorney's representations poten-
tially would have damaged being located in Idaho, it seems that, of the two juris-
dictions concerned, the largest effect from the attorney's conduct would be in Idaho.
However, the court noted that "the parties have litigated this proceeding as if the
[attorney's] acts had their predominant effect in Oregon. Where that conclusion is
at least plausible, we will accept it and proceed accordingly by applying Oregon's
disciplinary rules."'3
The second case, In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Marks, involved an
attorney who was licensed to practice law in both Wisconsin and Michigan.' 3 ' How-
ever, he maintained an office only in Michigan and "75 percent of his practice [was]
based in Michigan."' 132 A Wisconsin client retained the attorney to represent him in
a personal injury action. 133 The client's wife had been killed and his daughter and
granddaughter were injured in a Wisconsin automobile accident.'34 The other driver
involved in the accident was a Michigan resident. 35 The client terminated the attor-
ney's representation after about a week. 136 At this point, the attorney had already done
substantial work on the case but had not commenced a lawsuit. 37 The parties' retainer
agreement stated that the attorney would be paid for legal services performed at an
hourly rate plus expenses upon termination of the representation prior to resolution
of the case. 138 Despite this language, the attorney represented to two insurance
principal office in Idaho. Id. at 850 n.4.
129 Id. at 851.
30 Id. at 851-52. Whether the court applied Oregon or Idaho law most likely would not
have affected the outcome of the action because defrauding a potential litigant would subject the
attorney to discipline under the ethics laws of either jurisdiction. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CoNDuCT R. 4.1 (2002) ("In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person .... ). The court noted
that Idaho had also commenced disciplinary action against the attorney. In re Complaint as
to Conduct of Summer, 105 P.3d 848, 851 (Or. 2005).
'3' 665 N.W.2d 836, 838 (Wis. 2003).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 839.
131 Id. at 838-39. The court noted that the attorney had "contacted the district attorney's
office and the sheriff's department, met with his clients, and began to prepare pleadings." Id.
138 Id.
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companies that he maintained a lien in the amount of twenty-five percent of any
settlement of the former client's claims.'39 The client's new attorney subsequently
moved for a court order in Wisconsin state court declaring that the client's former
attorney was not entitled to any legal fees beyond the amount that he had originally
invoiced the client and calculated at an hourly rate.' 4 The former attorney then filed
a lawsuit in Michigan state court against the former client, the new attorney, and the
insurance companies "asserting a 'charging lien,"' among other grounds. 4'
Once the two actions were settled, the former client and his subsequent attorney
filed a grievance in Wisconsin against the original attorney under both the Wisconsin
and Michigan attorney ethics rules for representing to the insurers that he had a twenty-
five percent lien on the proceeds of the client's personal injury claims.'42 The ref-
eree who initially heard the matter determined that the "predominant effect" of the
attorney's conduct "occurred in Wisconsin because it affected the Koivistos, who are
Wisconsin residents.' 43 Therefore, Wisconsin law applied.'a
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not expressly review this determination by
the referee noting only that "[n]either party appears to dispute that the Wisconsin disci-
plinary rule was properly applied to this count.' 45 The referee's analysis apparently
would determine that the predominant effect of an attorney's conduct occurs in the
jurisdiction where the client resides. Another argument supporting the "predominant
effect" occurring in Wisconsin, although not mentioned in the opinion, would be that
'I Id. at 840.
'4 Id. The attorney initially indicated that the amount due to him pursuant to the language
in the retainer agreement was a little over $1,800. Id. at 839.
141 Id. at 840. The former attorney also alleged tortious interference with a contract. Id.
142 Id. at 842. The grievance also included claims brought only under the Michigan Rules of
Professional Conduct concerning the attorney having filed a complaint asserting breach of con-
tract after the client had terminated the representation and an amended complaint alleging that
his bill had not been paid when the amount of the bill had already been tendered. Id. The
referee who initially heard the action dismissed all grounds based wholly on Michigan ethics
rules, leaving only the first ground based on both Wisconsin and Michigan ethics rules. Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
141 Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, did hold explicitly that the referee erred in
dismissing the second and third grounds alleging violations of the Michigan Rules of
Professional Conduct due to the attorney filing the lawsuit in Michigan. Id. at 846. Applying
Wisconsin's choice of law rule, which is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule
8.5(b), the court held that under subsection (b)(1) of that rule, Michigan's ethics rules applied
to the attorney's conduct in filing and proceeding with the Michigan action because it was
"'conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has been autho-
rized to appear."' Id. (quoting Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 20:8.5(b)(1)).
The court also found that under Wisconsin's version of Model Rule 8.5(a), Wisconsin had
disciplinary jurisdiction such that the Wisconsin's Office of Lawyer Regulation could proceed
with a complaint against an attorney licensed to practice in Wisconsin alleging violations of
Michigan ethics rules in a proceeding in a Michigan state court. Id.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
a Wisconsin accident would have been at issue in any lawsuit filed on the client's
behalf. However, in determining where the "predominant effect" of an attorney's con-
duct occurred, the courts in both Marks and Summer appear to have weighed heavily
where the clients resided.' 46 This resulted in the application of the ethics law from
the client's jurisdiction to the attorney's conduct, which incidentally was also the juris-
diction of the courts making the choice of law determination.
With regard to ethics opinions, two New York opinions have addressed to some
extent the "principally practices" and "predominant effect" language in the New York
Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 1-105(b)(2)(ii), which
is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii). 47 In the first opin-
ion, an attorney's law firm prepared immigration forms for a husband and wife and then
submitted those forms to the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") office
in New Jersey where the clients lived. 48 Included among the documents was a form
by which the firm entered its appearance as the couple's "attorney of record." 149 The
husband and wife subsequently became involved in litigation, and after the husband
requested the wife's complete file, the attorney sought information on how much of
her file the law firm had to provide to the husband. 150
In a footnote, the ethics committee of the New York City Bar Association dealt
with which jurisdiction's law applied to this issue. 5' The committee first noted that
the attorney's letterhead indicated that "the attorney's firm maintain[ed] its practice
of law in the State of New York."'' 2 Moreover, the committee emphasized that "all
services rendered by the firm in this engagement were performed in or from New
York," although it recognized that the firm submitted the clients' INS documents to the
"4 See infra ntes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of client
residence in Marks and Summers cases).
"' New York Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 1-105(b)(2) states that
with regard to which jurisdiction's ethics rules should be applied to attorney conduct not in
connection with a proceeding in a court:
i. If the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this state, the rules to be
applied shall be the rules of this state, and
ii. If the lawyer is licensed to practice in this state and anotherjurisdiction,
the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in
which the lawyer principally practices; provided, however, that if par-
ticular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in anotherjurisdiction
in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction
shall be applied to that conduct.
N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrY DR 1-105(b)(2) (2003).
14' N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1999-07 (1999).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at n.l.
152 Id.
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New Jersey immigration office."' The committee concluded that the New York
Code of Professional Responsibility governed the law firm's "professional activities"
because New York was the "state in which the firm maintains its practice and in which
we assume the attorney and any others in the firm who worked on the engagement
are admitted to practice."" The committee presumably could have left the analysis
there using New York's DR 1-105(b)(2)(I), which is almost identical to the 1993
version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(I), dealing with the choice of ethics law when an attor-
ney is licensed in only one jurisdiction. Assuming that the attorneys that worked on
the couple's INS forms were licensed to practice only in New York, this provision
would call for the application of New York's ethics rules.'55
However, the committee went on to address the language in DR 1-105(b)(2)(ii),
which is almost identical to the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), dealing with
the applicable jurisdiction's ethics rules to use when an attorney is licensed in two
states. This may be due to the lack of information on whether any of the attorneys con-
cerned were also licensed to practice in New Jersey and the fact that the firm submit-
ted the INS forms in New Jersey. The committee stated that "[u]nder DR 1-105(B)(2),
because the lawyer principally practices in New York, the New York rules would apply
to his conduct in this instance."'56 The committee, though, did not go on to address
whether the attorneys' "conduct clearly ha[d] its predominant effect in another juris-
diction"' 57 in this situation New Jersey. Thus, the committee appears to have stopped
its analysis halfway through this portion of the choice of law provision.
Arguably, the law firm's conduct had its predominant effect in New Jersey where
both clients lived, where the firm had filed INS documents on the clients' behalf, and
where the attorneys entered an official appearance as the clients' attorneys. Alterna-
tively, although not mentioning the "predominant effect" language, the committee
could have implicitly determined that the "predominant effect" of the attorneys' con-
duct was in New York where the firm was located and where the attorneys prepared
the legal documents involved in the INS representation. This was also the jurisdiction
where the client's file concerned was located. Under this view, the clients' residence
and the jurisdiction where the law firm submitted the documents would be of little
consequence. Although perhaps constituting a misreading of the "predominant effect"
language in the choice of law rule, this interpretation is at least consistent with an appli-
cation of the entire test set out in New York's DR 1-105(b)(2)(ii).
153 Id.
154 id.
'5 See N.Y. CODEOFPROF'LRESPONSIBILITY DR 1- 105(b)(2)(i) (2003) (stating that "[i]f
the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this state, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of
this state").
156 N.Y. City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 1999-07, n.1
(1999).
157 N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-105(b)(2)(ii) (2003).
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In a second New York ethics opinion, an immigration law attorney licensed to
practice in both New York and Illinois, but who practiced in Chicago, raised a conflict
of interest issue concerning one former and one current client. 5 ' After quoting New
York's DR 1-105(b)(2),'59 the ethics committee of the New York State Bar Association
concluded that Illinois ethics rules applied to the attorney's conduct because "the juris-
diction in which the attorney principally practices [was] Illinois."' 6 Perhaps more in-
terestingly, the committee went on to state that even if the attorney had principally
practiced in New York, the Illinois ethics rules would apply because the "particular
conduct in the inquiry ha[d] its predominant effect in Illinois."'161 The opinion did not
state explicitly what the specific "conduct in the inquiry" was, except for earlier noting
that the attorney represented "individuals in immigration matters."' 62 Assuming that
the attorney's conduct at issue dealt with an immigration representation in Illinois,
the opinion can be interpreted as concluding that the "predominant effect" of such a
representation clearly would occur in Illinois, even if the attorney's office was in New
York. This is a more accurate interpretation of this language than in the prior ethics
opinion from the New York City Bar Association committee, and the opinion evi-
dences a complete application of the test set out in DR 1-105(b)(2)(ii), dealing with
attorneys licensed in two states. 63
As evidenced by the cases and ethics opinions dealing with the terms "pre-
dominant effect" in the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii), a more deliberate
and explicit application by courts and ethics committees of the test presented both
in the 1993 and current versions of the model choice of ethics law rule is necessary to
bring more predictability to this area. The available authority, however, illustrates
some significant factors in determining where the "predominant effect" of an attorney's
i58 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 750 (2001).
9 The committee also noted that New York's Disciplinary Rule 1-105 is based on Model
Rule 8.5. Id. at n. 1.
160 id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Two other recent New York ethics opinions note the possible existence of a choice of
ethics law issue with regard to a particular attorney's conduct without specifically resolving
the issue. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 768 (2003) (noting that "in the
context of a federal government agency in which a lawyer may be rendering services beyond
or outside the boundaries of this State, then the choice-of-law provisions of DR 1-105 may
apply" but assuming "[flor the purposes of this opinion" that "the New York Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility governs the conduct in question"); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Prof'l Ethics, Op. 742 (2001) (noting with regard to an attorney licensed to practice in New
York but employed overseas that "[w]hether the rules of professional conduct that would be
applied are those of New York or some other jurisdiction depends on whether the lawyer is
also admitted in another jurisdiction and, if so, the place where the lawyer 'principally prac-
tices' or where the lawyer's conduct has its 'predominant effect' and then applying New
York ethics law to the attorney's conduct without analysis).
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conduct occurs. While the courts in Summers and Marks ultimately acquiesced to the
wishes of the parties and applied the law of the jurisdiction where the court sat,164 in
both cases, this was the jurisdiction where the clients apparently lived and where the
underlying accident occurred that was the reason for the attorney's representation.'
65
So, the client's residence and the location of underlying events causing the need for
legal representation undoubtedly are important factors to consider in the "predominant
effect" determination. Additionally, the opinion of the New York State Bar Association
Ethics Committee concerning the Chicago attorney apparently placed importance on
the location of the court or agency office before which the attorney represented the
client." 6 So this also is a potentially significant factor.
67
Nevertheless, the ethics opinion from the New York City Bar Ethics Committee
would give an attorney grounds for arguing that where the attorney conducted the
actual legal work in other words physically drafted documents and conducted re-
search concerned in the representation is a factor in the "predominant effect" analysis. 6
Furthermore, the Summers case also considered the location of an opposing party and
where an opposing party's claims adjuster collected information regarding the accident
underlying the potential litigation. 69
While of course not binding, and perhaps not even very authoritative in otherjuris-
dictions, both the New York City ethics opinion and the Summer case demonstrate how
application of the "predominant" effect language may be problematic, especially con-
sidering the safe harbor language included in the 2002 version of Model Rule 8.5(b).
The safe harbor language states that an attorney will not be subject to discipline if his
or her conduct "conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably
believes the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will occur."' 7 ° Given the cur-
rent sparseness of authority on where the "predominant effect" of an attorney's conduct
occurs, the opinions of the New York City Ethics Committee and Summers provide
an attorney with grounds to argue that he or she reasonably believed that the "pre-
dominant effect" of any representation involving multiple jurisdictions occurred in
" In re Complaint as to Conduct of Summers, 105 P.3d 848, 851-52 (Or. 2005); In re
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marks, 665 N.W.2d 836, 836, 842 (Wis. 2003).
165 In re Summers, 105 P.3d at 850; In re Marks, 665 N.W.2d at 838.
166 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics, Op. 750 (2001) (stating that even if an
immigration law attorney had principally practiced in New York, the "particular conduct in
the inquiry ha[d] its predominant effect in Illinois"); see supra notes 159-62 and accompany-
ing text (analyzing this part of the ethics opinion).
67 Obviously, this factor would be less helpful, if not completely irrelevant, if a transactional
representation was involved.
168 See supra notes 151, 153-54 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the
conclusion by the New York City Bar's ethics committee that New York ethics law applied to
a New York City law firm's representation of a New Jersey couple in an immigration matter).
[69 In re Summers, 105 P.3d at 851.
[70 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
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his or her home jurisdiction where the attorney's office is physically located and
where he or she actually drafted documents, conducted research, or investigated the
legal matter concerned. This argument might be especially persuasive when an elec-
tronic representation is involved and the attorney never leaves his or her office in
representing the client. This, however, ignores the fact that the client who feels the
consequences of the representation is located in a different jurisdiction and that
where the attorney drafted documents or conducted legal research has little to no
relevance to where the effect of the representation is felt. As explained below, the
susceptibility of the relevant language to this outcome likely invalidates the current
version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) under dormant commerce clause principles when
applied to attorney Internet representations.'17
IV. THE DORMANT ASPECT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The dormant commerce clause is an implicit facet of the Commerce Clause in the
United States Constitution. 172 Because the Commerce Clause gives the United States
Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states, 73 state governments,
under the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause, cannot inhibit or frustrate trade
between states through legislation, even in the absence of congressional legislation. 74
This power to promote trade between the states, however, is balanced against the
federalist system of government created in the Constitution in which states and their
citizens retained powers not expressly given to the federal government. 75 For example,
171 See infra Part VI.C.
172 Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information Super-
highway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 17 BYUJ. PUB. L. 191, 193 (2003).
173 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes; .... ).
17" Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 193,208. The Commerce Clause arose from the recog-
nized need for the national government to have the ability to promote trade between the states
after the nation's experience with the Articles of Confederation when states erected internal
trade barriers through taxes and duties. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460,472 (2005) (stat-
ing that the dormant commerce clause "'reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was
an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to
succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles
of Confederation"' (alteration in original) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,325-26
(1979))); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) ("Under the Articles of
Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers
intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills."); Loudenslager, supra note
172, at 208 ("The Commerce Clause was written in order to avoid the 'Balkanization' of the
United States economy that resulted after the institution of Articles of Confederation.").
... See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
[Vol. 15:587
2006] E-LAWYERING, THE ABA & THE DORMANT COMMERE CLAUSE 621
states possess "police powers" allowing them to "regulate activities... affect[ing]
the health, safety, security and general welfare of their residents."'' 6 Assuming a state
is not attempting to further an improper purpose,"7 the basic question in a dormant
commerce clause analysis is whether state legislation inhibits interstate commerce to
such an extent that the state's interest should give way to the national interest in pro-
moting trade between the states."'
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court under its modem dormant commerce
clause test balances the benefits of the state regulation against the burden that such
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
176 Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 209; see also Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986)
("As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to 'place itself
in a position of economic isolation,' . . . it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources." (quoting Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,527 (1935))); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) (recognizing the "broad power in the State to protect its inhabitants
against perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and highway hazards, even by use of mea-
sures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce"); Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More
Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 395,418 n. 102 (1998) ("The Court has long recognized the idea that States have
an inherent 'police power' that allows them to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens.").
' Courts have recognized the intent to discriminate against interstate commerce as an im-
proper purpose of state legislation under the dormant commerce clause. See Granholm, 544 U.S.
at 472 ("States may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to
give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses."); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y.
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,579 (1986) ("When a state statute directly regulates or dis-
criminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests
over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.");
Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527 ("Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by
the state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier against com-
petition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents."). If a court can infer
that the state had such an intent in enacting legislation, this constitutes a "per se" violation of
the dormant commerce clause. Lawrence, supra note 176, at 426; Loudenslager, supra note
172, at 214.
178 LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 145 (2d ed. 1995) ("[Tlhe commerce clause has
caused courts to balance the forum's concededly legitimate interest against the needs of the
interstate commercial system" and "compares an existing local interest to the interests of other
states."); Lawrence, supra note 176, at 410 ("[Tlhe resolution of a particular case today will
turn in large part on a consideration of the local (state) interest in regulating local affairs as it
relates to the national interest in promoting interstate commerce."). Brilmayer states that the
Constitution's "prohibition on overreaching essentially compels a state not to treat [a] person,
business, or dispute as local when the state would prefer to do just that." BRILMAYER, supra, at
123. The Constitution prohibits such state overreaching because "a state may find it is in its
interest to apply its law, or employ its judicial authority, in situations where it has no legitimate
concern." Id.
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regulation places on interstate commerce. '79 The test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
states that even-handed or non-discriminatory regulations that promote "a legitimate
local public interest.., will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."'" Additionally, the Court
has invalidated "state regulations that have the effect, intended or not, of regulating
commerce that occurs 'wholly outside of the State's borders' as per se violations of
the Commerce Clause."'' Finally, in some instances when analyzing state statutes
under dormant commerce clause principles, the Supreme Court has examined whether
the statute "adversely affect[s] interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsis-
tent regulations."'82 However, a close reading of the cases dealing with state regulation
of the nation's highway and railroad systems-the major context in which the Court
has examined this last concern-indicates that the Court still uses a Pike balancing
analysis in these situations.'83
Several commentators have recognized the relevance of the dormant com-
merce clause principles to choice of law analysis. 1'" Both choice of law and dormant
"I Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 213-14 (explaining the Supreme Court's modem
dormant commerce clause test). "[T]he intrusive conduct that [the dormant commerce clause]
prohibits is conduct that is too costly in its impact on out-of-state activity considering the
limited domestic benefits it seeks to achieve ...." BRILMAYER, supra note 178, at 137.
180 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). "The commerce clause is violated when the state has a legiti-
mate reason for regulating, but in doing so it imposes severe burdens on conduct in other
states." BRILMAYER, supra note 178, at 136.
181 Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 215 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion)). For a more extensive discussion of Supreme Court cases
using this test, see generally Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 215-19.
182 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
183 Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 219-20; see, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429,441 (1978) ("Our recent decisions make clear that the inquiry necessarily
involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of the state regulatory concern
in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate commerce."); S. Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,770 (1945) ("[T]he matters for ultimate determination here are
the nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as
a safety measure, imposes on interstate commerce and... the relative weights of the state
and national interests involved."). For an extensive discussion of the Supreme Court's "trans-
portation cases," see Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 219-26.
184 See BRILMAYER, supra note 178, at 136-37, 144-48, 158-59 (discussing the limitations
that the Commerce Clause puts on the application of state substantive law to interstate activity);
Harold W. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as Limitation on State Choice-of-Law Doctrine,
84 HARv. L. REV. 806, 824 (1971) (discussing how the "[riecognition of the commerce clause
as a limitation on state choice-of-law doctrine" serves "the federal interest in promoting uni-
form and unburdensome patterns of regulation"); P. John Kozyris, Some Observations on State
Regulation of Multistate Takeovers- Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce
Clause, 14 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 499, 505 (1989) (discussing under dormant commerce clause
principles "the extent to which states other than the state of incorporation may apply their
laws to the transfer of control of multistate corporations which have some local contacts" and
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commerce clause principles compare competing state interests and analyze when the
application of a jurisdiction's substantive law is appropriate,"' and both ultimately are
concerned with how the various sovereign states in the American federalist structure
of government relate to one another, especially with regard to facilitating commerce
between states.'8 6 Thus, it is natural to examine the limits that the dormant commerce
clause puts on the choice of law decisions of states.
While the various choice of law regimes seek to decide which single jurisdiction's
law is most appropriate to apply to the activities of a particular actor, dormant com-
merce clause principles seek to determine only whether the application of a state's law
fails to meet the minimum thresholds required under the Constitution.'87 Therefore,
under the dormant commerce clause, at least in theory, it is possible that the application
of several states' laws may be appropriate.'88 The dormant commerce clause analysis
then would allow a choice of law regime to determine which particular jurisdiction's
"the scope of state authority to regulate multistate transactions in securities"); Louise Weinberg,
Choosing Law: The Limitations Debates, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 683,690, 713-15 (discussing
dormant commerce clause cases "bearing on extraterritorial applications of forum law when
the forum may have only a 'fractional interest' in applying its law");.
185 See BRILMAYER, supra note 178, at 147 (stating that the dormant commerce clause analy-
sis identifies the forum's interests and "explicitly considers the interest of the other states as
well and forms a comparative judgment" in determining "how much of the statute's effect is
legitimate and how much of it cannot be justified by a legitimate forum interest").
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 cmt. d (1969) ("Probably the
most important function of choice-of-law rules is to make the interstate and international systems
work well. Choice-of-law rules, among other things, should seek to further harmonious relations
between states and to facilitate commercial intercourse between them.").
Professor Brilmayer states that "[p]erhaps the most obvious benefits" of states joining
with other states in a federal government "are the increased commercial prospects integration
offers." BRILMAYER, supra note 178, at 131. "One purpose of federalism was to establish a
'common market' nationwide, in which the products produced in one state would not be dis-
criminated against in others." Id. "When one thinks of protection from discrimination against
the business interests of other states, the constitutional provision that immediately comes to mind
is the commerce clause." Id. at 132; see also supra note 174 and the authorities cited therein
(discussing the purpose of the Commerce Clause to promote trade between states and prevent
states from erecting internal trade barriers).
187 See BRILMAYER, supra note 178, at 164 (stating that one of the manners in which con-
stitutional determinations are different from traditional state choice of law determinations is
that constitutional determinations "impose a minimal threshold rather than singling out one
state's law as the best"); Horowitz, supra note 184, at 824 (describing "the commerce clause
as a limitation on state choice-of-law doctrine"). The federal constitutional standard "is a
minimal, rather than an ideal, test." BRILMAYER, supra note 178, at 165.
188 BRILMAYER, supra note 178, at 165 ("[C]urrent constitutional doctrine asks only whether
a state might reasonably find that it has an interest or that application of its law is fair. A state
need not have a greater interest than other states.... It need only make a decision that falls
within reasonable limits."). Thus, it is possible in any given circumstance that more than one
state might reasonably have an interest in regulating an activity.
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law, out of those that pass Constitutional muster, most appropriately should control
the rights of parties in specific circumstances.
V. APPLICATION OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE TO STATE REGULATION
OF THE INTERNET
A. Case Law Applying Dormant Commerce Clause to State Regulation of
Internet Activity
Cases analyzing state regulation of Internet activity under the dormant commerce
clause mainly have dealt with three different types of state statutes. The first type of
statute criminalizes knowingly posting material on the Internet that would be "harmful
to minors.', 189 These statutes often can be construed to hold the operator of a Web site
criminally liable simply for making such material available on a Web site whether
or not the operator was aware of specific instances when minors accessed such
189 See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 230 (4thCir. 2004) (invalidating, under
the dormant commerce clause, a Virginia statute making it unlawful to "knowingly display for
commercial purposes in a manner whereby juveniles may examine or peruse" images or an
"electronic file or message containing an image" or an "electronic file or message containing
words, or sound recording" depicting or describing "sexually explicit nudity, [or] sexual con-
duct" that "is harmful to juveniles"); Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 99 (2d
Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause a Vermont statute
prohibiting the use of the Internet to distribute to minors sexually explicit materials "harmful
to minors"); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a statute prohibiting dissemination of materials harmful to minors by computer
was unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969
F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (invalidating under the dormant commerce clause a New
York statute making it a felony to "intentionally use[] any computer communication system" to
communicate to a minor material of a sexual nature "which is harmful to minors" (alteration
in original)). One commentator has termed these laws "dissemination statutes." Chin Pann,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and State Regulation of the Internet: Are Laws Protecting
Minorsfrom Sexual Predators Constitutionally Different Than Those Protecting Minorsfrom
Sexually Explicit Materials?, 2005 DuKE L. &TECH. REv. 8, 1 1, http://www.law.duke.edu/
joumals/dltr/artices/PDF/2005DLTROO08.pdf.
In defining "harmful to minors," these statutes often rely on the U.S. Supreme Court's
First Amendment obscenity test and require that the material: (I) predominantly appeals to the
prurient interest of minors; (2) be patently offensive to the prevailing standards of the adult
community; and (3) lack serious artistic, political and scientific value. See, e.g., PSINet, Inc.,
362 F.3d at 231 (describing the Virginia statute's definition of "harmful to juveniles"); Am.
Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 100 n. 1 (setting out the Vermont statutes "[h]armful to minors"
definition); Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 163 (describing New York statute's definition
of "harmful to minors").
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material.'90 Courts overwhelmingly have held that such statutes violate the dormant
commerce clause.191
The second type of statute criminalizes the use of the Internet to intentionally
"lure," "seduce," or "solicit" minors into engaging in sexual activity with an adult.'
19 2
These cases often involve an adult initially communicating with a police officer posing
as a minor in an Internet chat room or bulletin board and engaging in sexually explicit
discussions with the supposed minor.193 Often the adult attempts to meet the intended
190 See PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 235 (explaining that "speakers who publish on the Web
generally make their materials publicly available to users around the world, regardless of age,
and lack any practical or reliable means for preventing minors from gaining access to the infor-
mation on their sites or for verifying the true age of users of their Web sites" (citation omitted));
Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 100 (stating that the terms of the Vermont statute at issue
"can be easily read to apply to material placed on a [Wlebsite or shared with an email or [I]nter-
net discussion group"); Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 168-69 (stating that under the
New York statute at issue a Web site operator might be subject to "regulation by states that the
actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed" and the statute
was not limited to "person-to-person" communications); see also Loudenslager, supra note 172,
at 254 (explaining that by interpreting broadly the New York statute at issue in Am. Libraries
Ass'n, the statute "could reach a person or entity that simply intended to post or communicate the
material considered 'harmful to minors' and did not intend for such material to reach a minor").
'9 See infra notes 199-207 and accompanying text (explaining main grounds courts have
used to invalidate statutes criminalizing posting of material harmful to minors on the Internet).
192 See, e.g., Hatch v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453,464 (Ct. App.
2000) (examining a California statute making it a felony for a person to use the Internet to
distribute "any harmful matter.., to a minor" knowing that a minor is receiving the matter
"with the intent of arousing, [or] appealing to... passions or sexual desires of that person
or of a minor" and with the purpose or intent of seducing a minor); Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d
430,433-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (analyzing Florida statute making it a felony for a person
to "knowingly" use the Internet "to seduce, solicit, lure, or entice," or to attempt any of these
with, "a child or another person believed by the person to be a child, to commit any illegal
act.., relating to sexual battery... lewdness and indecent exposure" or "child abuse"); People
v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 2000) (scrutinizing a New York statute prohibiting
"disseminating indecent material to minors" in order to "importune[], invite[] or induce[] a
minor to engage in" sexual activity); State v. Snyder, 801 N.E.2d 876, 880-81 (Ohio Ct. App.
2003) (examining an Ohio statute prohibiting the use of the Internet to "solicit" another person
and "to engage in sexual activity" when the solicitor is an adult and "believes that the other
person is thirteen years of age or older but less than sixteen years of age").
"' See, e.g., Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460-61 (setting out the Internet communications
between the defendant and a woman posing as two different thirteen year-old girls); Cashatt,
873 So. 2d at 433 (providing details concerning defendant's Internet communications with a
police officer posing as a fourteen-year-old boy "by means of a 'bulletin board' posting and
ensuing e-mail messages"); State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431,433 (N.D. 2003) (describing
Internet chat room communications between defendant and a police officer posing as a fourteen-
year-old girl); State v. Bolden, No. 19943, 2004 WL 1043317, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 7,
2004) (summarizing communications between defendant and a police officer posing as a
fifteen-year-old girl in an Internet chat room).
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minor victim in person for the purpose of engaging in sexual activity. " Courts over-
whelmingly have held that these statutes do not violate the dormant commerce clause. '95
The third main category of state statutes regulate the sending of unsolicited com-
mercial e-mail or "span." 96 These statues generally prohibit sending spam to state
One commentator has described the crimes that these statutes proscribe as "'Internet
luring' or 'enticement."' Julie Sorenson Stanger, Comment, Salvaging States'Rights to Protect
Children from Internet Predation: State Power to Regulate InternetActivity Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 2005 BYUL. REv. 191, 192; see also Pann, supra note 189, 1 (describ-
ing such laws as "luring statutes"). "Such a crime is patterned after the traditional crimes of
solicitation and attempt but specifically addresses the sexual solicitation of a minor over the
Internet." Stanger, supra, at 192.
'" See, e.g., Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462 (defendant met with woman posing as thirteen-
year-old at a hotel pool); Cashatt, 873 So. 2d at 433 (defendant arranged to meet with supposed
boy and "showed up at the meeting place at the time agreed upon"); Backlund, 672 N.W.2d
at 433 (defendant arranged to meet with police officer posing as a fourteen-year-old girl at
a convenience store where the defendant ultimately was arrested); Snyder, 801 N.E.2d at 880
(defendant and police officer posing as a fourteen-year-old girl arranged to meet at a restaurant
where defendant was arrested).
'9' See infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text (explaining the analysis of courts holding
that statutes preventing the use of the Internet to seduce or lure minors into engaging in sexual
activity do not violate the dormant commerce clause).
Some commentators have noted that the opinions invalidating statutes criminalizing the
posting of material harmful to minors on the Internet have largely come from federal courts,
while the cases holding the statutes constitutional that prohibit the use of the Internet to lure
minors into sexual activity with an adult are from state courts. Pann, supra note 189, V 2-3
(explaining that this has likely occurred because "a multitude of interested parties seeking to
protect their speech" initiated the cases dealing with "dissemination statutes" in federal court
as "preemptive requests for injunctions" while state authorities brought the criminal charges
against the defendants who challenged the "luring statutes"); Stanger, supra note 193, at 203,
211 (noting that "[a]lthough federal courts have not yet reviewed the validity of state Internet
luring statutes, they have struck down other statutes intended to protect minors from sexually
explicit and harmful Internet material" while "state courts have consistently... upheld state
police power to regulate Internet activity harmful to minors").
.96 See Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523,526,531-36 (D. Md. 2006)
(holding that a Maryland statute "authoriz[ing] recipients of commercial e-mail... to sue
senders who know or should know that the recipient's e-mail address is in Maryland and who
use the domain name or e-mail address of a third person without permission or who send a mes-
sage which contains false or misleading information" was constitutional under the dormant
commerce clause); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 260,263-69 (Ct. App.
2002) (holding that a California statute regulating "conduct by persons or entities doing busi-
ness in California who transmit unsolicited advertising materials" through electronic mail
and fax machines was valid under the dormant commerce clause); MaryCLE, LLC v. First
Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818, 840-45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (holding that a Maryland
statute regulating unsolicited commercial e-mail, otherwise known as "span," was valid under
the dormant commerce clause); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 407 (Wash. 2001) (upholding
under the dormant commerce clause a Washington statute that prohibited "sending a com-
mercial e-mail message from a computer located in Washington or to an e-mail address held
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residents when the e-mail contains false or misleading information concerning the
subject, origin or transmission path of the e-mail."9 Courts have held that such statutes
do not violate the dormant commerce clause.'98 While several cases have dealt with
anti-spam statutes, the bulk of the case law examining state regulation of the Internet
under the dormant commerce clause has dealt with the first two types of statutes.
In dealing with the first category of statutes that hold Web site operators liable for
making harmful material available to minors on the Internet, courts have used three
main grounds to invalidate such statutes under the Commerce Clause. First, courts
have asserted that such statutes project a state's legislative regime outside of the
state by affecting operators of Web sites who are physically located outside of the state
and who may or may not have people from within the state visit their Web site.' 9
Therefore, the legislation affects commerce that occurs outside of the state or, in other
words, operates extraterritorially. The site operator must comply with another state's
by a Washington resident" that misrepresented or disguised "the message's point of origin or
transmission path, or use[d] a misleading subject line"); see also Commonwealth v. Jaynes,
65 Va. Cir. 355,365-71 (Cir. Ct. 2004) (holding Virginia anti-spain statute was valid under the
dormant commerce clause), affd, No. 1054-05-4,2006 Va. App. LEXIS 411 (Ct. App. 2006).
Two additional cases do not fit into any of the three categories mentioned in the text but
have dealt with statutes that largely regulate non-Internet activity and only incidentally regulate
Internet conduct. See Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493,505 (5th Cir.
2001) (holding that the application of the Texas motor vehicle code to a car manufacturer's use
of a Web site to sell cars in that state did not violate the dormant commerce clause); SPGGC,
Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87, 102 (D. Conn. 2006) (holding that applying the Con-
necticut Gift Card Law to Internet sales of gift cards to Connecticut residents did not violate
the dormant commerce clause).
'9' See, e.g., Beyond Sys., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27; MaryCLE, LLC, 890 A.2d at 827;
Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 356; Heckel, 24 P.3d at 407; see also Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260
(describing California statute requiring senders of unsolicited e-mail to "include as the first
text in the e-mailed document a statement informing the recipient of the toll-free number or
[the valid sender operated] return [e-mail] address that may be used to notify the sender not
to e-mail any further unsolicited material").
198 See infra notes 220-27 and accompanying text (setting out the analysis of courts holding
that anti-spam statutes are valid under the dormant commerce clause).
'9 PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 240 (4th Cir. 2004) ("Given the broad reach
of the Internet, it is difficult to see how a blanket regulation of Internet material, such as [the
Virginia statute at issue], can be construed to have only a local effect."); Am. Booksellers Found.
v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) ("In practical effect, Vermont [through the statute
at issue] 'has "projected its legislation" into other States, and directly regulated commerce
therein,' in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause." (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584 (1986))); Am. Civil Liberties Union v.
Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that the New Mexico statute at issue
"represents an attempt to regulate interstate conduct occurring outside New Mexico's borders,
and is accordingly a per se violation of the Commerce Clause"); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki,
969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("New York has deliberately imposed its legislation
on the Internet and, by doing so, projected its law into other states whose citizens use the Net.").
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statute to avoid criminal prosecution-despite being physically located in a different
state-whether or not residents of the other state actually visit the site.2 ' ° Second, using
the Pike balancing test, courts have found that the burden placed on interstate com-
merce by such legislation outweighs its putative benefits.2°' These cases, although
recognizing that states have a legitimate interest in protecting minors from harm,202
have minimized the benefits of such a statute due to jurisdictional restraints that pre-
vent a state from prosecuting operators of Web sites who physically are located outside
of the state.20 3
200 See Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 177 ("The nature of the Internet makes it im-
possible to restrict the effects of the New York Act to conduct occurring within New York ....
[C]onduct that may be legal in the state in which the user acts can subject the user to prose-
cution in New York and thus subordinate the user's home state's policy... to New York's
local concerns.").
The Second Circuit described the effect of such legislation in the following manner:
A person outside Vermont who posts information on a [W]ebsite or on
an electronic discussion group cannot prevent people in Vermont from
accessing the material. If someone in Connecticut posts material for the
intended benefit of other people in Connecticut, that person must assume
that someone from Vermont may also view the material. This means that
those outside Vermont must comply with [the Vermont statute] or risk
prosecution by Vermont. Vermont has "project[ed]" [its statute] onto the
rest of the nation.
Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103 (second alteration in the original).
201 PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (holding that the Virginia statute at issue "fails under the
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of Pike v. Bruce Church"); Am. Civil Liberties Union,
194 F.3d at 1161 ("[U]nder the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the burdens on
interstate commerce imposed by [the New Mexico statute at issue] exceed any local benefits
conferred by the statute."); Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 181 ("The severe burden on
interstate commerce resulting from the New York statute is not justifiable in light of the attenu-
ated local benefits arising from it.").
202 PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 ("There is no question that Virginia has a compelling in-
terest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors."); Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 194 F.3d at 1161 ("We agree that the protection of minors from [harmful] materials
is an undeniably compelling governmental interest .... ");Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at
177 ("[T]he protection of children against pedophilia is a quintessentially legitimate state
objective....").
203 PSINet, Inc., 362 F.3d at 240 (noting that if the Virginia statue only reached intrastate
communication, "it will have no local benefit given the vast number of other communication
options available to ajuvenile seeking them"); Am. Civil Liberties Union, 194 F.3d at 1162
(noting the "practical difficulties" of New Mexico prosecuting parties for violating the statute
concerned "but whose only contact with [New Mexico] occurs via the Internet" (alteration
in original) (quotingAm. LibrariesAss'n, 969 F. Supp. at 178)); Cyberspace, Conmc'ns, Inc.
v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1999), affd, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000)
("[T]he [Michigan] Act will be wholly ineffective in achieving the asserted goal because nearly
half of all Internet communications originate overseas."); Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at
178 ("The local benefits likely to result from the New York Act are not overwhelming. The Act
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Third, some courts have gone beyond analysis of the particular statute at hand and
asserted more broadly that only the federal government may regulate the Internet under
dormant commerce clause principles.24 Courts generally have made this argument
in the following manner. The interstate nature of the Internet necessitates consistent
treatment of Internet activity,2 5 and thus, to avoid inconsistent state regulatory regimes
from "paralyz[ing] the development of the Internet altogether" only federal Internet
regulation is appropriate. 26 Since Web site operators cannot cut off access to their sites
from particular states, allowing states to regulate the Internet would require a Web site
operator to comply with the most stringent state regulation that existed, which would
inevitably stunt the growth of some types of commercial activity on the Internet.2 °7
can have no effect on communications originating outside of the United States.... Further,
in the present case, New York's prosecution of parties from out of state who have allegedly vio-
lated the Act, but whose only contact with New York occurs via the Internet, is beset with prac-
tical difficulties, even if New York is able to exercise criminal jurisdiction over such parties.").
204 Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 104 ("We think it likely that the [I]ntemet will soon
be seen as falling within the class of subjects that are protected from State regulation because
they 'imperatively demand[] a single uniform rule."' (alteration in original) (quoting Cooley
v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851)));Am. Civil Liberties Union, 194 F.3d
at 1162 ("[C]ertain types of commerce have been recognized as requiring national regulation....
The Internet is surely such a medium."); Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 181 ('The courts
have long recognized that certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment and are there-
fore susceptible to regulation only on a national level. The Internet represents one of those areas;
effective regulation will require national, and more likely global cooperation.").
Some courts have described this effectively as a pre-emption argument. Hatch v. Superior
Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453,471 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Pataki's [argument] ... is a sort of pre-
emption argument: that simply logging on the Internet automatically places one beyond the
reach of state criminal prosecution."); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191 (Ct. App. 2000)
(describing this analysis as "essentially a preemption analysis").
205 Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 182 (stating that the Internet "requires a cohesive
national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations");
see also Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F.3d at 103 ("Because the [I]ntemet does not recognize
geographic boundaries, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a state to regulate [Intemet acti-
vities without 'project[ing] its legislation into other States."' (alteration in original) (quoting
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 (1989))).
2"6 Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 181; see also Cyberspace, Commc 'ns, Inc., 55 F.
Supp. 2d at752 ("The [Michigan] Act, and other state statutes like it, would subject the Internet
to inconsistent regulations across the nation. Information is a commodity and must flow freely.").
207 Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 183; see also Am. Booksellers Found., 342 F. 3d at
103 ("Although Vermont aims to protect only Vermont minors, the rest of the nation is forced
to comply with its regulation or risk prosecution."); Cyberspace, Commc'ns, Inc., 55 F. Supp.
2d at 751 ("A New York speaker must comply with the Act in order to avoid the risk of pro-
secution in Michigan even though (s)he does not intend his [or her] message to be read in
Michigan."). This third ground for invalidating statutes-criminalizing the mere posting of
material on the Internet-appears to "double dip" because it uses the supposed extraterritorial
reach of state regulation to argue for national regulation of the Internet. Therefore, this actually
is not a separate ground, as stated by these courts, but it is just a continuation of the argument
629
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However, the cases that have made this sweeping argument ignore that the
Supreme Court has still used the Pike balancing test in the primary context in which
the Court has mentioned the consistency of state regulation as a concern, the cases deal-
ing with regulation of the United States' highway and railway systems.0 8 Therefore,
in the instances when the Court ultimately determined that state regulations of high-
ways and railways were unconstitutional, the Court held that the burden created by
compliance with the different regulations of several states outweighed the benefit
derived by the states seeking to regulate the activity at issue.2 9 Cases setting out this
argument also ignore that on Web sites that are more interactive, the site operator will
have opportunities to learn the physical location of the site user.2
Courts have held that the second category of statutes prohibiting adults from using
the Internet to lure, seduce, or solicit minors into engaging in sexual activity do not
operate extraterritorially or overburden commerce.21' First, these courts have reasoned
that these "luring" statutes regulate conduct that, at least partially, occurs within the
prosecuting state.1 Generally, a defendant must commit at least part of a crime in
a state in order to be subject to a state's criminal jurisdiction.2 3 In determining whether
a state has criminal jurisdiction over a defendant who communicated electronically
with a state resident while physically located outside of the prosecuting state, several
courts have held that the criminal conduct is not complete until "the offending words
for the first ground.
208 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the ultimate test applied by the
Supreme Court in the "transportation cases"); see also Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 250
(refuting the argument asserting the necessity of consistent Internet regulation as a grounds
for invalidating state Internet regulations under the dormant commerce clause).
209 See Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 250 ("[T]he Court has tended to invalidate a
state's regulation of railways and highways when the regulation is widely out of step with
most other states' regulation of the subject matter, thus greatly raising the cost of compliance
with the regulation .... ).
20 See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text (explaining how the interactivity of a
Web site affects the potential burden of complying with different state regulations).
211 See infra notes 212-21 and accompanying text (explaining the reasoning of courts faced
with "luring" Internet statutes for holding that such statutes do not violate the dormant com-
merce clause).
212 See infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (explaining courts' reasoning that defen-
dants have acted within the jurisdiction through Internet communications with residents).
213 See People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 WL 470853, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27,2002)
(finding that California's "seducing" statute at issue "in the context of the [California] Penal
Code as a whole, only penalizes acts that occur within the state"); Hatch v. Superior Court,
94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 472 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that "[tihe assumption that extraterritorial
enforcement of state criminal statutes is normative is incorrect" and that in order to be subject
to California's criminal jurisdiction a person must have committed part of the crime within
California); State v. Cunningham, 808 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) ("Ohio has
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes that are partially committed in the state and also where the
object of the crime is located in Ohio.").
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are heard by another person" or received electronically inside the state of prosecution." 4
Thus, the defendant acts, at least partially, in the prosecuting state when he or she in-
tentionally transmits electronic communications to a minor located in the prosecuting
state. 25 Additionally, in many of these cases, the adult, in order to achieve his or her
ultimate objective, needs to obtain information about the minor's geographic location
and often travels to the prosecuting state in order to meet the minor face-to-face.1 6
Therefore, courts have held that these "luring" statutes prosecute activity that occurs
within that jurisdiction and do not operate extraterritorially.2 7
Second, courts have found that the burden placed on interstate commerce by such
statutes is very slight. This is largely because these statutes do not regulate legiti-
mate commerce.21 8 Moreover, the intent requirements of these statutes greatly reduce
214 People v. Ruppenthal, 771 N.E.2d 1002, 1008 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002); see also State v.
Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431,436 (N.D. 2003) (quoting Ruppenthal and holding that "a person
who, while outside of this state, solicits criminal action within this state and is thereafter found
in this state" is subject to criminal jurisdiction); Commonwealth v. John, 854 A.2d 591,595 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2004) (holding that a defendant who sent e-mail communications from Maryland
and Delaware to a Pennsylvania police officer posing as a thirteen year-old girl made solici-
tations in Pennsylvania "where they were received").
Courts have treated telephone communications in a similar manner. See United States
v. Pezzino, 535 F.2d 483,484 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that federal statute prohibiting the trans-
mission of bets or wagers on sporting events over interstate communication facilities included
both the "use of interstate facilities for sending or receiving wagering information"); United
States v. Synodinos, 218 F. Supp. 479, 481 (D. Utah 1963) (holding that Utah was a proper
venue for a prosecution for transmission of bets or wagers on sporting events over interstate
facilities because "the District of Utah [was] where the use of the interstate wire facilities had
its ultimate impact, i.e., it was here that the messages... were actually received"); State v.
Meyers, 825 P.2d 1062, 1064-65 (Haw. 1992) (upholding conviction in Hawaii for terrorist-
like threats made by a defendant located in California through a telephone call to a probation
officer in Hawaii).
215 See Cunningham, 808 N.E.2d at 495 (finding Ohio's criminal jurisdiction appropriate
because, among other things, the defendant's intended "victim was located in Ohio" and "[tihe
recipient of the Defendant's Internet communications was located in Ohio, and the Defendant
was given notice of this during the communications"); John, 854 A.2d at 596 ("Certainly,
a person who receives a criminal solicitation while sitting at her computer terminal in
Pennsylvania is being solicited within this Commonwealth.").
216 See supra note 194 (providing examples of cases where the defendant attempted to meet
the intended victim in person).
217 People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191 (Ct. App. 2000) ("When [the California statute
at issue] is harmonized with the entire California penal scheme, it does not effectively regulate
activities beyond California."); Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 ("[T]here is no reason to suppose
California would attempt to impose its policies on other states in light of the relevant Cali-
fornia penal statutes covering jurisdiction over public offenses[,] which generally bar punishment
for wholly extraterritorial offenses."); Cunningham, 808 N.E.2d at 495 (holding that the defen-
dant's "over-extension and over-breadth arguments do not apply to this case").
218 E.g., Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430,436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) ("[N]o legitimate
commerce is burdened by penalizing the transmission of harmful sexual material to known
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the number of electronic communications affected by the regulations.2 19 In order to be
criminally liable, a defendant must intentionally send material to a known minor with
the intent to seduce or lure the minor into engaging in sexual activity. 2 0 Thus, courts
have held that states' compelling interest in protecting minors from harm outweighs
the burden, if any, that luring or solicitation statutes place on interstate commerce.22 1
minors in order to seduce them."); People v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 133 (N.Y. 2000) ("We are
hard pressed to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is derived from the intentional trans-
mission of sexually graphic images to minors for the purpose of luring them into sexual activity.
Indeed, the conduct sought to be sanctioned by [the New York statute at issue] is of the sort
that deserves no 'economic' protection."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000); Backlund, 672
N.W.2d at 438 ("[I]t is difficult to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is derived from the
willful transmission of explicit or implicit sexual communications to a person believed to be
a minor in order to willfully lure that person into sexual activity.").
One commentator has gone a step further and asserted that "luring a minor over the Inter-
net" does not involve commerce at all, "and, as such, should not be subject to the dormant
Commerce Clause blocking power." Stanger, supra note 193, at 220. But see Pann, supra note
189, 29 (stating that "the state courts have overstated their position when contending that
no legitimate commerce is burdened, as states may have different policies on what conduct
is prohibited").
219 People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 WL 470853, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002)
("[T]he intent to seduce requirement greatly narrows the scope of the law and its effect on
interstate commerce."); Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472 ("While a ban on simple communi-
cation of certain materials may interfere with an adult's legitimate rights, a ban on communi-
cation of specified matter to a minorfor the purposes of seduction can only affect the rights
of a very narrow class of adults who intend to engage in sex with minors."); Cashatt, 873 So.
2d at 436 ("[T]he statute does not burden Interet users with inconsistent state regulations
because of the 'intent to seduce' element, which makes it much narrower than the statute
invalidated in American Libraries Association ...."); People v. Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d 248,
256 (App. Div. 1999) (noting that "[t]he inclusion of the second ['luring'] prong [of the New
York statute at issue] narrows its scope and lessens any burden on commerce"), affd, 731
N.E.2d 1213 (N.Y. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000); Stanger, supra note 193, at 227
("[L]uring statutes are unlikely to have any type of 'chilling effect' on Internet commerce
because they proscribe only a narrow range of Internet activity.").
220 Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191 ("Only when material is disseminated to a known minor
with the intent to arouse the prurient interest of the sender and/or minor and with the intent
to seduce the minor does the dissemination become a criminal act."); State v. Bolden, No.
19943, 2004 WL 1043317, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App.) (explaining that the Ohio statute at issue
"does not regulate the mere transmission of pictures, images, or messages that are deemed
harmful to children;" instead, the statute "regulates the conduct of adults who seek to solicit
minors to engage in sexual activity in conversations by means of the Internet").
221 Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 ("[N]o rational analysis supports the proposition that
[the California statute at issue] imposes any burden on interstate commerce."); Cashatt, 873
So. 2d at 436 ('The effect of [the Florida statute at issue] on interstate commerce is incidental
at best and is far outweighed by the state's interest in preventing harm to minors."); Foley, 731
N.E.2d at 133 (holding that the New York "luring" statute at issue was "a valid exercise of the
State's general police powers"); Bolden, 2004 WL 1043317, at *7 (holding that Ohio "soliciting"
statute "[did] not unduly interfere with interstate commerce" (quoting State v. Snyder, 801
N.E. 2d 876, 886 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003))).
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Courts dealing with state anti-sparn statutes-the third main category of state
Internet statutes that courts have examined under the dormant commerce clause-
have followed an analysis similar to the one followed in cases dealing with luring
or solicitation statutes. First, these courts have found that the anti-spam statutes con-
cerned do not operate extraterritorially.222 Courts have found that the language of
these statutes constrain their application to senders of e-mail who either utilize com-
puters within the state or that specifically target residents of the state concerned.
223
Therefore, such statutes do not apply to conduct occurring wholly outside of the
regulating state.
One case used reasoning similar to the two arguments set out in the text above to find
a California statute prohibiting the use of"an electronic communication device" to "willfully
threaten [] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person"
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. People v. Vijay, No. H024123, 2003 WL 23030492,
at *6,9-10 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2003) (alteration in original). The defendant had threatened
the husband of an ex-girlfriend with bodily harm in an e-mail. Id. at *4-5. The court found
that: "California prosecutes only those criminal acts that occur wholly or partially within the
state.... Thus, [the criminal threat statute at issue] cannot be enforced beyond that which is
jurisdictionally allowed." Id. at * 10. Furthermore, the court found that the intent requirement
of the statute greatly narrowed the effect of the statute on Internet activity: "To violate [the
statute] the offender must willfully threaten to commit a crime that would result in death or
great bodily injury, and he must make the threat with the specific intent that the statement be
taken as a threat." Id. The court stated that it could not "envision any legitimate commerce
involving the sending of messages that threaten death or great bodily injury to the recipient
such that that person is put in sustained fear for his or her own safety." Id. at *10 n.7.
222 Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258,264 (Ct. App. 2002); MaryCLE,
LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818,842-44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006); Common-
wealth v. Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. 355, 368 (Cir. Ct. 2004), affd, No. 1054-05-11, 2006 Va. App.
LEXIS 44 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404,412 (Wash. 2001); see also Beyond
Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523,534-35 (D. Md. 2006) (finding that Mary-
land anti-sparn statute did not operate extraterritorially by expressly adopting the analysis
from Heckel and MaryCLE).
223 Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264 (finding that the California anti-spairn statute "applies
only when [unsolicited commercial e-mail] is sent to a California resident by means of an
electronic-mail service provider who has equipment in the State"); MaryCLE, LLC, 890 A.2d
at 844 (finding that the Maryland anti-spain statute "has built-in safeguards to ensure that it
does not regulate conduct occurring wholly outside of Maryland" because "[in order to violate
the Act, an email advertiser must either use equipment located in the State of Maryland or
send prohibited [unsolicited commercial e-mail] to someone he knows or should know is a
Maryland resident"); Heckel, 24 P.3d at 412-13 (finding that the Washington anti-sparn
statute "addresses the conduct of spammers in targeting Washington consumers" and that the
statute "reaches only those deceptive [unsolicited commercial e-mail] messages directed to
a Washington resident or initiated from a computer located in Washington"); see also Jaynes,
65 Va. Cir. at 368 (finding that in order for Virginia's anti-spam statute to apply, "[i]t would
have to be established that either the unsolicited bulk electronic mail was transmitted through
or into a computer network of an electronic mail provider or one or [sic] its subscribers located
in Loudoun County, Virginia").
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Second, courts dealing with state anti-spam statutes have held that any burden
placed on interstate commerce from such statutes is outweighed by the benefits to
the regulating state. These cases have found that anti-spam regulations do not bur-
den interstate commerce but in fact facilitate it.224 Additionally, such statutes do not
burden senders of unsolicited, bulk commercial e-mail with the difficulty of comply-
ing with inconsistent state regulations because anti-spam statutes simply require that
the senders of such e-mail include accurate and truthful information concerning the
subject and source of such e-mail, which is not contrary to any other state's regula-
tions.22 Thus, anti-spare statutes do not constitute a significant burden on legitimate
interstate commerce.
Furthermore, states have a legitimate interest in protecting consumers from fraudu-
lent and misleading business practices conducted through e-mail.226 Courts further have
recognized the significant economic costs that spam or unsolicited e-mails create.227
224 Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268 ("To the extent that section 17538.4 requires truth-
fulness in advertising, it does not burden interstate commerce at all 'but actually "facilitates
it by eliminating fraud and deception .... (quoting Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411)); Jaynes, 65 Va.
Cir. at 369 (stating that requiring "disingenuous information, intentionally created, be deleted
from the routing process is not a weighty burden, if a burden at all, to be imposed on any person
or business choosing to send bulk e-mails"); Heckel, 24 P.3d at 411 (finding that "the only
burden the Act places on spammers is the requirement of truthfulness, a requirement that does
not burden commerce at all but actually 'facilitates it by eliminating fraud and deception"'
(quoting Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
110 YALE L.J. 785, 819 (2001))); see also MaryCLE, LLC, 890 A.2d at 842 ("When the only
burden [the Maryland anti-span statute] imposes is that of sending truthful and non-deceptive
email, '[t]hat [the Respondent] considers [the statute's] requirements inconvenient and even
impractical does not mean that statute violates the [C]ommerce [C]lause."' (quoting Ferguson,
115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265)).
225 See MaryCLE, LLC, 890 A.2d at 844 ("No state is likely to consider that the welfare of
a business that engages in false or misleading advertising is a legitimate interest, worthy of state
protection."); Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 369 ("A survey of state laws regulating bulk electronic
mail finds that none conflict with the Virginia statute."); Heckel, 24 P.3d at 412 ("The truth-
fulness requirements of the Act do not conflict with any of the requirements in the other states'
statutes, and it is inconceivable that any state would ever pass a law requiring spammers to
use misleading subject lines or transmission paths.").
226 Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268 (finding that "California has a substantial legitimate
interest in protecting its citizens from the harmful effects of deceptive [unsolicited commercial
e-mail]," which include unsolicited commercial e-mail containing "offensive subject matter,
[being] a favored method for pursuing questionable if not fraudulent business schemes, and
[being] successfully used to spread harmful computer viruses"); MaryCLE, LLC, 890 A.2d at
835 ("Maryland certainly has an interest in protecting its consumers, not only from the costs
associated with [unsolicited commercial e-mail] proliferation, but also from becoming victims
of fraud and schemes initiated by false and misleading email.").
227 Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267 (stating that "Intemet Service Providers (ISPs) incur
significant business-related costs" due to spam and that "[i]ndividuals who receive [unsolicited
commercial e-mail] can experience increased Internet access fees"); MaryCLE, LLC, 890 A.2d
at 836 ("[T]he financial costs of spain and [unsolicited commercial e-mail] are great. To this
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Promulgating legislation in order to reduce such costs advances a legitimate state ob-
jective. 28 Consequently, courts have held that state anti-spam statutes further legiti-
mate state interests while posing a very slight, if any, burden to interstate commerce
and are valid under the dormant commerce clause.229
B. Reconciling the Cases Dealing with State Regulation of the Internet According
to the Degree of Anonymity and Interactivity of the Particular Internet
Communication Affected by the Applicable Regulation
The three main categories of cases examining state regulation of the Internet under
the dormant commerce clause illustrate how the degree of anonymity between Web site
users and operators affects the burden of complying with different state regulations.
The anonymity of Internet communications is one of the major characteristics of the
operation of the Internet that can make compliance with different state regulations espe-
cially difficult. 23 ° Internet users are often unable to determine the physical location
effect, a recent University of Maryland study concluded that deleting unwanted email costs
nearly $22 billion annually in lost productivity."); Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 368 (acknowledging
that the United States Congress has stated that "[tihe growth in unsolicited commercial electronic
mail imposes significant monetary costs on providers of Internet access services, businesses,
and educational and nonprofit institutions that carry and receive such mail" (alteration in
original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7701(6) (2004))); Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409-10 (describing the
economic costs experienced by businesses, such as Internet service providers, and individuals
that receive spam).
228 Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268 ("[P]rotecting a state's citizens from the economic
damage caused by deceptive [unsolicited commercial e-mail] constitutes a 'legitimate local
purpose."' (quoting Heckel, 24 P.3d at 410)); Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 368 ("The Common-
wealth clearly has an interest in the protection of the property interests of its citizens [affect-
ed by spam]."); Heckel, 24 P.3d at 410 (finding that the Washington anti-span statute
"serves the 'legitimate local purpose' of banning the cost-shifting inherent in the sending of
deceptive span").
229 See, e.g., Ferguson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267-69; MaryCLE, LLC, 890 A.2d at 842;
Jaynes, 65 Va. Cir. at 368-69; Heckel, 24 P.3d at 409-11; see also Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Key-
netics Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 538 (D. Md. 2006) (holding that the Maryland anti-spain
statute did not violate the dormant commerce clause by adopting the analysis from Heckel
and MaryCLE).
230 Transience is another significant characteristic of Internet communications that poten-
tially makes compliance with different state regulations problematic. Loudenslager, supra note
172, at 242. 'Transience refers to the almost infinite number of paths, through numerous states,
that data can travel when two computers on the Internet communicate with one another." Id.
Transience results from the distributed network and packet-switching technology used to trans-
port computer data across the Internet. Id. at 203-04; see also id. at 195-97 (providing a more
in-depth explanation of the distributed network and packet-switching technology used in
Internet communications).
However, two factors decrease the potential burden of transience. First, a state has very
little incentive to regulate activity when transient data travels through computers located in
that state en route to an end recipient in another state because such activity "does not cause any
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of the computers that facilitate Internet communications because the Domain Name
System ("DNS")23' and Universal Resource Locator ("URL") 232 used to tell computers
where to retrieve or transport data do not necessarily correspond to any specific geo-
graphic location.233 Instead, the DNS and URL provide a hierarchical structure for
computers to translate textual names into computer addresses.234 Consequently, Web
site operators are often unaware of the physical location of users of the site.235
The degree of interactivity of the Internet communications involved determines
how much anonymity ultimately will remain between users. For example, operators
of "passive" Web sites who simply "publish information which others can view on
the site" and do nothing else will have little opportunity to learn of the physical location
of users of the site.2  On the other hand, operators of more "interactive" Web sites that
allow, or in some instances require, users to exchange information with the operator's
practical effect in the first state." Id. at 247. "A state only has an incentive to regulate Internet
communications that either originate or are received physically within the geographic bound-
aries of that state because those are the situations when the activity can cause harmful effects
in that state." Id. at 247-48.
Second, criminal jurisdiction limits the ability of a state to enforce its regulations on the
Internet. Id. at 248. Criminal jurisdiction requires that a defendant commit at least part of an
offense within the prosecuting state. Id. Moreover, in order to prosecute an individual, a state
normally "would have to extradite a person located in another state." Id. "[E]xtradition from
one state to another is limited to individuals who have fled the state that seeks extradition."
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 224, at 815. "Thus, it seems very unlikely that '[a] Web site
operator who has never had a presence in the regulating state' would face prosecution there."
Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 248 (quoting Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 224, at 815); see
also id. at 247-49 (providing a more in-depth explanation of how the lack of a state incentive
to regulate Internet activity involving transient computer data and criminaljurisdiction decreases
the potential extraterritorial effect of state Internet regulations).
231 1 DOUGLAS E. COMER, INTERNErWORKING WITH TCP/IP: PRINCIPLES, PROTOCOLS, AND
ARCHrrECTURES 465 (4th ed. 2000) (describing the "mechanism that implements a machine
name hierarchy" for Internet computers to communicate with each other "is called the Domain
Name System (DNS)").
232 CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVrrIS ET AL., HISTORY OFTHE INTERNET: A CHRONOLOGY, 1843
TO THE PRESENT 164 (1999) (stating that Universal Resource Locators are known as "URLs").
233 Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 204. "Some authorities refer to the URL as the Uniform
Resource Locator as opposed to the Universal Resource Locator." Id. at 202 n.71 (first
emphasis added); see also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916,929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), afid, 521
U.S. 1113 (1997); COMER, supra note 231, at 528; JOE HABRAKEN, ABSOLUTE BEGINNER'S
GUIDE TO NETWORKING 236 (3d ed. 2001).
234 Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 204. For a more in-depth explanation of how computers
transport computer data over the Internet and the World Wide Web, see id. at 198-203.
235 Id. at 205 ("By itself, the transporting of computer data across the Web from a server to
a computer using Web-browser software does not provide the site operator with any information
about the location of the person using the Web browser.").
236 Id.; see also Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997) (describing a "passive Web site" as a site "that does little more than make information
available to those who are interested in it").
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computer server have more ability to discover the user's physical location.237 Pre-
sumably, "[t]he more interactions that occur between the user and the Web site, the
more opportunities the host or operator of the site has to obtain information from the
user about the user's physical location. 238 Similarly, people using electronic mail or
communicating in a chat room have the opportunity to discover the physical location
of one another. Once an Internet user discovers another party's physical location, the
user can then either continue the communication or end it if the user knows that the
jurisdiction in which the other party is located prohibits the activity. Without knowl-
edge of the physical location of the other party, though, users have to comply with the
most stringent state regulation that exists, whether individuals located in that state
are involved in the communication or not. Therefore, the level of interactivity of the
Intemet communications concerned affects how burdensome compliance with different
state Internet regulations can be.
Consequently, the interactivity of the Internet communications governed by a par-
ticular state regulation is a key factor in reconciling the cases that have analyzed state
regulation of Internet activity under the dormant commerce clause. 239 The state Internet
regulations that courts have invalidated under the dormant commerce clause potentially
attacked passive Internet activity.24 These statutes prohibited Web site operators from
posting material on the Internet that would be "harmful to minors" and would cover
passive Web sites where operators or hosts just made information available to site users
and had no additional contact with site users.24
On the other hand, the state Internet regulations that courts have held passed
muster under the dormant commerce clause regulated more interactive Internet
activity.242 The first category of these statutes largely prohibited the use of the
Internet by adults to lure known minors into engaging in sexual activity with the
adult.24 3 The activity affected by these statutes often involved the adult engaging in
237 Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 205-06. Additionally, when a Web site sells tangible
goods, the operator will likely need to know the physical location of the site user in order to ship
those goods to the user. Id. at 206. While this assumes that the shipping address corresponds
to the physical location of the user, "the buyer [in most instances will have] every incentive to
provide the host With accurate shipping information in order to receive the goods purchased."
Id. This factor, however, is less relevant to the current analysis because this article involves
the provision of a service, specifically the giving of legal advice, over the Internet and not
a tangible good.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 251-52,254-55 (reconciling the Hatch and American Libraries Ass'n cases accord-
ing to the interactivity of the Internet conduct affected by the statutes at issue in each case).
240 Id. at 254 (analyzing the statute at issue in the American Libraries Ass'n case).
241 Id. (analyzing the statute at issue in the American Libraries Ass'n case); see supra
notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
242 See Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 254 (analyzing the statute at issue in the Hatch
case).
243 See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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multiple communications over the Internet with the person believed to be a minor.2"
In order to violate the statute, the adult had to discover from the other party that they
245were a minor. Moreover, due to the interactive nature of the activity involved, the
potential defendant had the opportunity to discover the physical location of the
target and also had an incentive to discover the physical location of the target in order
to facilitate a face-to-face meeting.24
The second category of state Internet statutes that courts have held valid under
the dormant commerce clause prohibited the use of false or misleading information
concerning the subject or origin of unsolicited, bulk commercial e-mail, otherwise
known as "span."247 These statutes largely applied to actors who either utilized com-
puter equipment in the regulating state, targeted residents of the state concerned, or
sent e-mail to people that they knew or could have discovered through reasonable
efforts were residents of the regulating state.248 E-mail itself is a much more inter-
active medium than a passive Web site. For example, someone sending commercial
e-mail from the outset can choose to whom such e-mail is sent, while the publisher of
a passive Web site, once he or she has posted information on the Web site, has little
control over which states' residents access the site.249 Furthermore, e-mail by its very
nature allows for the exchange of information between the sender and the recipient,
including discovery of each other's physical location. Thus, the dormant commerce
clause case law to date has tended to invalidate state Internet regulations that affected
passive Internet activity and to uphold regulations that dealt with more interactive
Internet communications.
VI. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ABA CHOICE OF
ETHICS LAW RULE, MODEL RULE 8.5(B)(2), WHEN APPLIED TO E-LAWYERING
The dormant commerce clause test boils down to whether the burden placed on
interstate commerce by the state regulation outweighs the benefit to the state interest
244 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
245 Loudenslager, supra note 172, at 251.
24 See id. at 252; see also supra note 194 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
248 See, e.g., MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, 890 A.2d 818, 844 (Md. Ct. Sp.
App. 2006) (finding that "[iun order to violate the [Maryland anti-spam statute], an email
advertiser must either use equipment located in the State of Maryland or send prohibited
[unsolicited commercial e-mail] to someone he knows or should know is a Maryland resident");
State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 412-13 (Wa. 2001) (finding that the Washington anti-span
statute "addresses the conduct of spainmers in targeting Washington consumers" and that the
statute "reaches only those deceptive [unsolicited commercial e-mail] messages directed to
a Washington resident or initiated from a computer located in Washington").
249 MaryCLE, LLC, 890 A.2d at 844 ("[Whereas a commercial emailer can choose between
one recipient and another, 'no Web siteholder is able to close his site to' persons from other
states." (quoting Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1997))).
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that the regulation promotes unless the state regulation at issue discriminates against
out-of-state actors on its face or a court can discern this was the purpose of the regu-
lation.25° The current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) would apply a state's ethics law
to all attorney conduct by attorneys with offices located within as well as outside of
the regulating state that "occurred" or had its "predominant effect" within a state. 5
Therefore, because this rule treats both resident and non-resident attorneys in the
same manner, it is appropriate to apply the dormant commerce clause balancing test
from Pike v. Bruce Church to examine the constitutionality of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2)
in the context of attorney representations of clients over the Internet.252
The following hypothetical provides a concrete example of a potential Internet
representation of a client and facilitates a more clear understanding of the interests,
or lack thereof, of the various states that potentially could regulate and apply their laws
to an attorney's electronic representation of a client. An attorney with an office located
in Cincinnati, Ohio has a practice that, among other areas, focuses on landlord-tenant
and fair housing law. The attorney is licensed to practice only in Ohio. In order to
attract new clients, the attorney from time to time participates in Internet bulletin boards
where people with questions about landlord-tenant and fair housing law post questions.
A mother with three young children residing in Roanoke, Virginia recently was
turned down after applying for a two-bedroom apartment in a local apartment complex.
The reason given by the manager of the apartment complex was that the mother would
have exceeded the three person occupancy limit for that apartment. The manager of
the apartment complex explained that it has a policy of allowing only one more occu-
pant than the number of bedrooms in each apartment. 3 The mother posts a question
setting out her situation on an Internet bulletin board dealing with landlord-tenant law
asking whether the complex's occupancy policy violates any laws and asking whether
there are any government offices that can help her.
The Ohio attorney posts a reply to the mother's initial post on the landlord-tenant
Internet bulletin board and explains the process of lodging a complaint with the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") as well as how com-
plaints are lodged with most state agencies that deal with fair housing matters. He
also explains the process that HUD generally uses in processing such complaints. He
250 See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text (explaining the basic dormant commerce
clause test from Pike v. Bruce Church).
25 MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
252 Cf. On Petition for Review of Opinion 475 of Advisory Comm. Prof 1 Ethic & DR
2-102(c), 444 A.2d 1092, 1100 (N.J. 1982) (holding that a New Jersey restriction on use in
firm names of names of attorneys not licensed to practice in New Jersey did not discriminate
against interstate commerce because the restriction applied to both residents and non-residents
who were not licensed to practice in New Jersey, and applying the Pike v. Bruce Church balanc-
ing test to examine whether the regulation violated the dormant commerce clause), appeal
dismissed, 459 U.S. 962 (1982).
253 Thus, a maximum of two occupants would be allowed in one-bedroom apartments, and
three occupants would be allowed in two-bedroom apartments.
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further states that it is possible that the apartment complex's occupancy policy violates
federal fair housing laws due to a disparate impact on families. He explains, however,
that he would need more information from the mother and would have to do some
legal research in order to form a more definitive opinion. The attorney includes the
Web address of his firm's Web site in his reply post in case the mother would like to
discuss this matter further with him.
The mother goes ahead and submits a housing discrimination complaint to HUD,
and she also decides to contact the attorney about potentially filing a lawsuit against
the apartment complex. The mother goes to the attorney's Web site. The attorney's
Web site describes his practice and qualifications. The home page of the Web site also
contains a link entitled, "What are my rights?" 54 When a visitor to the Web site clicks
on that link, he or she is then taken to another Web page entitled, "Wondering about
a legal problem that you have?" This page presents a client intake form to the visitor
that asks for the visitor's name, contact information (including an e-mail address), a
brief description of the visitor's legal problem, a listing of other parties or actors in-
volved with the visitor's legal problem, and any questions that the visitor has for the
attorney about his or her legal problem. The mother fills out the client intake form and
clicks on the "Submit" button at the end of the intake form, which sends her infor-
mation to the attorney's computer in Ohio.
After receiving the potential client's information through his Web site, the attor-
ney runs a conflicts check and then sends an e-mail to the mother, stating the terms of
the representation, again stating his belief that the occupancy policy of the apartment
complex violates fair housing laws, and attaching an information packet for the client
to fill out. The mother in Virginia fills out the information packet provided to her and
then sends the packet back to the Ohio attorney as an attachment to an e-mail. The
attorney follows up on the information provided in the information packet by sending
e-mail messages to the client, engaging in some legal research, and eventually commu-
nicating the client's position to HUD through a letter and several telephone calls before
HUD reaches a resolution with the apartment complex.
A. The Burden on E-Lawyering of Complying with Different State Ethical Regimes
Electronic representations of clients involve interactive Internet communica-
tions that would decrease anonymity among the parties involved and decrease the
burden of complying with differing state ethical rules with regard to such conduct.
As explained above, the anonymous nature of communications over the Internet is
one of the major factors that burdens Internet actors when complying with differing
254 Several characteristics of this Web site are based on a hypothetical presented in a
California ethics opinion. Cal. Bar Standing Comm. on Prof 1 Responsibility and Conduct,
Formal Op. 2005-168 (2005).
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state regulations. 55 However, when Internet communications are more interactive,
anonymity among actors decreases. 56 Electronic representations of clients involve
interactive communications between the attorney and client that allow the attorney
to discover the client's physical location and then comport his or her conduct to the
ethical rules of that jurisdiction. This is especially true when e-mail communications
and communications on Internet bulletin boards are involved. Some Internet bulletin
boards even require that a user seeking legal advice indicate the jurisdiction in which
they are located.27 Furthermore, an attorney providing a form on a Web site to facili-
tate client communication can adapt the form to require the client to indicate the
jurisdiction where he or she physically is located. For example, in the hypothetical
presented above, the attorney first had an opportunity to enquire about the jurisdiction
in which the mother lived-if he did not get this information from her initial post-
when he posted a reply on the Internet bulletin board. The attorney had a second oppor-
tunity to discover where the mother resided through the client intake form included
on the firm's Web site.
While the example above did not involve contact between the attorney and
client in a real-time Internet chat room, even in this context an attorney would have
an opportunity to ask about the physical location of an individual who has asked a legal
question. Admittedly, an attorney in a real-time situation would have less time to dis-
cern the ethical requirements of the applicable jurisdiction in order to comply with
them. However, an attorney that engages in chat room discussions on a regular basis
could familiarize him or herself in advance with the jurisdictions that prohibit cer-
tain activity and end communications with individuals from those jurisdictions. More-
over, an attorney involved in an electronic representation of a client in any context
will need to know the client's physical location in order to provide competent legal
advice. If the attorney does not have this information, he or she should not be provid-
ing legal advice. Consequently, anonymity is not a characteristic of electronic repre-
sentations of clients, and, therefore, one of the largest factors that creates a burden on
Internet actors complying with the regulatory regime of different states is not an issue
in this context.
Nevertheless, in electronic representations of clients there is a burden placed on
the attorney to ascertain and then comport his or her activity with the ethical regula-
tions of different jurisdictions, especially if some jurisdictions prohibit the attorney's
activity. For example, in the hypothetical above, the attorney located in Ohio would
have to familiarize himself with both Ohio and Virginia's legal ethics rules, ascertain
whether or not either state prohibits electronic representations, and, if not, whether
either state imposes any special duties on attorneys that engage in such representa-
tions. The attorney would also have to determine if Virginia's ethics rules conflict
255 See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 236-49 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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with Ohio's rules in any relevant aspect, and, if so, determine which state's ethics laws
should apply to his conduct.
However, the burden faced by attorneys in such situations is much less signifi-
cant than the heavy burdens faced by individuals operating passive Web sites as
much of the case law dealing with state Internet regulations notes. The interactivity
of the Internet communications involved in e-lawyering prevents the attorney from
having to comply with the regulations of the most restrictive states when the repre-
sentation has no relationship with those states. For example, the Ohio attorney would
only have to consider the duties and restrictions imposed by Ohio and Virginia's ethic
rules, not the ethics rules of every state. As long as Ohio and Virginia allowed this
type of representation, the attorney could engage in this electronic representation de-
spite otherjurisdictions prohibiting electronic representation. In this manner, one juris-
diction would not control the conduct of actors in electronic representations bearing
no relationship at all to that jurisdiction. Thus, any concerns about the extraterrito-
rial application of states' ethics laws similar to those expressed in the line of cases in-
validating state regulation of the Internet under the dormant commerce clause are not
relevant in this context.
B. The Benefits to Potential Jurisdictions of Applying Their Ethical Regimes to
E-Lawyering
Having analyzed the burden placed on attorneys in ascertaining which jurisdiction's
ethic rules would apply when engaging in electronic representations, it is necessary to
examine the benefit to the potential states whose ethical regimes could apply to any
given representation. In an electronic representation involving an attorney and client
physically located in different jurisdictions, the ethics laws of both the client's home
jurisdiction and the attorney's home jurisdiction are potentially applicable to the attor-
ney's conduct. The current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) applies the ethics laws
"of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's conduct occurred" to an attorney unless
"the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction.' ' 58 A court would
most likely find that the lawyer's conduct occurred or the predominant effect of the
conduct in an electronic representation was felt in either the client's home jurisdiction,
where the attorney concerned presumably is not licensed, or the attorney's home juris-
diction, where the attorney presumably is licensed. In the hypothetical, the ethics rules
of Ohio, where the attorney's office is located, and the ethics rules of Virginia, where
the client resides, are potentially applicable to the electronic representation concerned.
A dormant commerce clause analysis requires measuring the benefit to each of
these jurisdictions of applying its ethics law to electronic legal representations to
determine whether the benefit exceeds the burden placed on interstate commerce. To
determine the benefit to each jurisdiction, the actual interest of each jurisdiction in
regulating electronic representations first must be examined.
'58 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
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1. Interest of Jurisdiction Where Client Resides in Regulating Electronic
Representation
In an attorney's electronic representation of a client, the jurisdiction where the
client is located (the client's home jurisdiction) has a legitimate consumer protection
interest in applying its ethics rules to this activity in most situations. Therefore, in
the hypothetical presented above, Virginia has a legitimate interest in regulating this
situation because the consequences of the representation ultimately are felt in Virginia.
In Virginia, the client acts upon the attorney's legal advice and experiences the end
result of that advice.
The first question in the electronic representation concerned would be whether
the Ohio attorney has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The stated pur-
pose of unauthorized practice regulations is consumer protection; more specifically,
to protect state residents from representation in legal matters by people who have not
satisfied the various licensing requirements that ensure a person will provide com-
petent and ethical legal representation to individuals. 2 9 In other words, Virginia's
259 See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,792 (1975) ("We recognize that the States
have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that as part
of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power
to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions.");
MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2002) ("[L]imiting the practice of law to
members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified
persons."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4, cmt. b (2000)
("The primary justification given for unauthorized practice limitations was that of consumer
protection-to protect consumers of unauthorized practitioner services against the significant
risk of harm believed to be threatened by the nonlawyer practitioner's incompetence or lack
of ethical constraints."); Ritts, supra note 97, at 24 ("[W]hen foreign lawyers act in a state,
outside of court, the state clearly has an interest in regulating their conduct, in order to protect
such residents of the state as might come in contact with them."). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4, cmt. c (2000) (stating that "[s]everal jurisdictions recog-
nize that many [out-of-court legal] services can be provided by nonlawyers without significant
risk of incompetent service" and "that actual experience in several states with extensive non-
lawyer provision of traditional legal services indicates no significant risk of harm to consumers
of such services"); RHODE, supra note 10, at 89 ("Three years in law school and passage of a
bar exam are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure expertise in the areas where nonlawyer
services flourish; lay specialists may be better able to provide cost-effective services than law-
yers who practice in multiple fields."); Richard L. Abel, United States: The Contradictions of
Professionalism, in 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIEry: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 186, 188 (Richard L.
Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) (stating that with regard to legal ethics attorneys' "sub-
stantive rules and [] disciplinary process have been unresponsive to consumer grievances,
especially since neither does anything to ensure continuing technical competence among
lawyers"); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to.Ordinary Americans, 44 CASEW.
RES. L. REV. 531, 571 (1994) ("The current law of unauthorized practice goes too far in seeking
to protect consumers from competitive services provided by nonlawyers. Consumer groups and
ratings can guide consumers in choosing services. Malpractice liability is likely to provide
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unauthorized practice laws provide some measure of protection to Virginia residents
from incompetent legal representation. Another initial issue would be whether or
not the attorney has violated any rules governing solicitation of potential clients. A
state's legal solicitation rules serve an additional consumer protection function of en-
suring that attorneys do not take advantage of state residents through the manner in
which they contact potential clients or in the representations that they make to pro-
spective clients.2 60
A jurisdiction's determination that an attorney can provide competent and diligent
representation to its residents, including adequate communication with the client and
implementing procedures to avoid conflicts of interest in an electronic context, would
inform the unauthorized practice decision. In the hypothetical presented above, for
example, it is appropriate for Virginia, where the mother resides, to weigh the bene-
fits of allowing attorneys located outside of and, presumably, not licensed in Virginia
to provide legal advice to Virginia residents through Internet bulletin boards or e-mail
communications. The mother initially came into contact with the attorney when he
posted a reply to the mother's initial Internet bulletin board post about an apartment
complex's rejection of her application due to the size of her family. The mother
learned some beneficial information through the attorney's reply post. She learned
about the process for initiating a complaint with HUD, and she received a prelimi-
nary opinion about whether she had a discrimination claim against the apartment
complex. This is information that she would not have had absent the communication
from the attorney. There are, however, some significant legal ethics issues concern-
ing the manner in which the mother received this information. The attorney provided
a legal opinion on whether the mother had a valid discrimination claim against the
greater protection than professional controls applied to lawyers.").
260 See Fla. Bar v. Went For it, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620-21,624-25 (1995) (recognizing that
states have "a substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury
victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers" while examining
Florida regulations that created "a brief 30-day blackout period after an accident during which
lawyers may not, directly or indirectly, single out accident victims or their relatives in order
to solicit their business"); Chambers v. Stengel, 37 S.W.3d 741, 743 (Ky. 2001) (holding that
the "General Assembly [was] within its police power to respond... through legislation" to the
"emotional harm to the accident and disaster victims" who received direct solicitations from
attorneys soon after an incident); MODEL RULES OFPROF'LCONDuCTR. 7.1 (2002) (prohibiting
attorneys from making a "false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's
services"); id. R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (noting that "[a]n advertisement that truthfully reports a lawyer's
achievements on behalf of clients or former clients may be misleading if presented so as to lead
a reasonable person to form an unjustified expectation that the same results could be obtained
for other clients in similar matters without reference to the specific factual and legal circum-
stances of each client's case"); id. R. 7.3 cmt. 5 (recognizing that even written forms of solici-
tation, which are permitted under the Model Rules, "can be abused" and should not be "false
or misleading" or involve "coercion, duress or harassment" as defined under Model Rules
7.1 and 7.3(b)(2)).
[Vol. 15:587
2006] E-LAWYERING, THE ABA & THE DORMANT COMMERE CLAUSE
apartment complex based on very minimal information from her, with very little
opportunity for follow up questions, and without being able to make a complete con-
flicts check.
States have applied their unauthorized practice laws and solicitation rules to anal-
ogous situations, often with little to no choice of law analysis, where attorneys located
and licensed in other jurisdictions attempted to procure residents of the regulating state
as clients through normal United States mail communications. In a series of recent,
related cases, the Indiana Supreme Court applied Indiana's unauthorized practice of
law and solicitation rules to attorneys who had sent written solicitations by United
States mail to survivors of and relatives of people killed in a military plane crash in
Evansville, Indiana. 61 These cases did not explicitly analyze the propriety of applying
Indiana ethics law to the conduct of attorneys licensed to practice in outside juris-
dictions, but instead, they discussed the appropriateness of Indiana asserting disci-
plinary jurisdiction over such attorneys.262
The court determined that it had disciplinary jurisdiction over the attorneys be-
cause "any acts" the attorneys took in Indiana constituting the practice of law were
"subject to [the court' s] exclusive jurisdiction to regulate professional legal activity
in [Indiana]. 263 Moreover, the court emphasized that the attorneys had directed activ-
ity that had affected Indiana residents:
By directing the solicitations to the prospective clients, the respon-
dents communicated to those persons that they were available to
261 In re Coale, 775 N.E.2d 1079, 1080-81 (Ind. 2002) ("By their own admission, the respon-
dents sent videotapes, personal letters and folders containing information about their law firm
and a firm brochure to seven people who were widows, widowers or surviving parents of the
crash victims or to the crash victims themselves."); In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d 719, 720
(Ind. 2001) (noting that the attorneys "caused to be delivered by United States mail written
solicitations to prospective clients in connection with the crash"); see also Sterns v. Lundberg,
922 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D. Ind. 1996) ("[The attorneys,] although not admitted to practice
law in Indiana, directed mailings to survivors and the families of deceased crash victims in
order to solicit potential clients.").
262 See In re Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1080-81 (holding that the Indiana Supreme Court could
properly exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over one attorney licensed to practice in the District
of Columbia and one attorney licensed to practice in California who directed written solicitations
by United States mail to airplane crash victims); In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 720-21
(holding that the Indiana Supreme Court could properly exercise disciplinary jurisdiction
over two attorneys licensed to practice in California who directed written solicitations by United
States mail to airplane crash victims); see also Stems, 922 F. Supp. at 168, 169 (holding that
federal court would abstain from interfering in Indiana disciplinary proceeding when, among
other things, the state court had already ruled on the propriety of asserting disciplinary jurisdic-
tion and decided that subjecting "out-of-state lawyers who solicit Indiana citizens to [Indiana's]
disciplinary rules [was] not foreclosed by existing caselaw [sic]").
263 In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 721; accord In re Coale, 775 N.E.2d at 1081 (quoting
In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E. 2d at 721).
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act in a representative capacity for them in Indiana courts to
address loss or injury associated with the plane crash. As such,
they held themselves out to the public as lawyers in this state
when neither was admitted to practice here. Those acts consti-
tuted professional legal activity in this state subject to our regu-
latory authority.264
The Indiana Supreme Court went on to apply Indiana ethics law to the conduct of the
attorneys concerned without analyzing whether this was appropriate.265 Presumably,
the court believed that the justification for applying Indiana ethics rules to the attor-
neys in this situation was so apparent and inherent in the court's powers as to not
require any discussion beyond that provided in deciding whether disciplinary juris-
diction was appropriate.2  The same policy justification exists for applying the ethics
law of the jurisdiction where the client resides whether the attorney communicates
through regular mail, by telephone, or through the Internet. In each of these contexts,
the jurisdiction has an interest in protecting consumers of legal services that reside
in that jurisdiction.
264 In reMurgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 721 (citation and footnote omitted); see also In re Coale,
775 N.E.2d at 1081 (quoting and applying analysis from Murgatroyd to other attorneys not
licensed in Indiana who directed solicitations to survivors and families of victims of the
Indiana airplane crash). A federal court also held that the Indiana Disciplinary Commission
had a reasonable argument for subjecting the attorneys to Indiana's disciplinary jurisdiction
in deciding to abstain from interfering in one of Indiana's disciplinary actions. Stems, 922 F.
Supp. at 169 ("[Tihe Court is simply not convinced that the Commission has no chance of
subjecting out-of-state lawyers to Indiana's disciplinary rules.... [A]t worst, the Commission's
attempt to subject out-of-state lawyers who solicit Indiana citizens to this state's disciplinary
rules is not foreclosed by existing caselaw [sic] and might even constitute an important case
of first impression."). Although never explicitly stated in any of the decisions, the attorneys
apparently directed at least some of their solicitations to Indiana residents.
265 The court explicitly applied Indiana law to Coale and Allen. See In re Coale, 775 N.E.2d
at 1083-84. Because Murgatroyd and Sterns presented the court with a proposed agreed judg-
ment with the state disciplinary commission, the court cited and discussed Indiana ethics law
without directly applying it. See In re Murgatroyd, 741 N.E.2d at 721-22 nn.3-8, 722; see also
Ill. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Conduct, Advisory Op. 94-2 (1994) (applying Illinois's
unauthorized practice of law statute to an attorney licensed "only in a state other than Illinois"
who mailed "packets of material advertising his law firm's personal injury litigation services,
with letters of solicitation, to persons who were injured in major disasters in Illinois").
266 Such a view effectively would fold the choice of law analysis into the disciplinary juris-
diction decision. This might have arisen from the fact that at the time of these decisions Indiana
had only incorporated the original version of Model Rule 8.5, which did not contain a choice
of law provision into its ethics rules. IND. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 hist. & statutory
notes (West 2005) (setting out the language of the version of Rule 8.5 effective from Jan. 1,
1987, to Dec. 31, 2004). It is also possible that the Indiana court simply did not think about
the appropriateness of applying its law in this situation.
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In the hypothetical situation discussed above, should Virginia decide to allow
the electronic representation, the next step is to determine if the attorney should use
any special precautions or procedures during the representation. It is appropriate
for Virginia, where the client resides, to determine how best to protect its residents
in such representations. Consumer protection considerations similar to those dis-
cussed above would inform this decision. In other words, Virginia should decide what
safeguards an attorney should employ to deal with the advertising, solicitation, confi-
dentiality, and conflicts issues267 that arise in electronic representations of Virginia
residents because the client experiences the benefits of or harm from the representa-
tion in Virginia.
2. Lack of Interest of Attorney's Home Jurisdiction in Applying Its Ethics Law to
an Electronic Representation that Affects a Resident of Another State
The attorney's home state does not have a corresponding consumer interest in regu-
lating the electronic representation by applying its ethics law to the representation.
Although Ohio is the attorney's licensing state, it has a negligible interest in choosing
the best manner of protecting a Virginia resident, whom the Ohio attorney represents
"electronically," whether it decides not to allow such representations, or to allow such
representations if certain safeguards are used. This is especially the case if Virginia,
where the client resides, has decided to protect its citizens in a different manner than
Ohio. Ohio has a negligible interest when the consequences of the attorney's actions
are experienced by a Virginia resident in Virginia. Virginia is where the mother acted
upon the attorney's advice by filing a HUT claim, where the mother is seeking an apart-
ment, and where the mother will experience the benefit or harm that results from the
manner in which her legal problem is resolved. Therefore, Ohio has very little to no
interest in applying Ohio law to determine whether the attorney is engaging in the un-
authorized practice of law by providing legal advice through the Internet to a person
residing in Virginia. Ohio also has no interest in determining through its ethics law
how Virginia residents are solicited.
Ohio might assert that it has an interest in regulating the conduct of attorneys it
licenses, no matter where that conduct occurs or is felt, in order to protect the purity
of its bar.268 In the past, some courts have asserted that the licensing jurisdiction's
interest in "purifying" the attorneys it licenses to practice law justifies the application
of that jurisdiction's ethics laws to such attorneys' conduct that occurs outside of the
267 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (setting out the ethical issues, recognized
by various jurisdictions, that electronic representations raise).
268 The rationale for such extraterritorial application of the licensing jurisdiction's ethics
rules is that the licensing state has "an obligation to protect the 'purity' of the state's bar, and
that 'purification' [requires] vigilance against questionable conduct of lawyers, no matter where
it [occurs]." Ritts, supra note 97, at 27.
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borders of the licensing jurisdiction.269 In many of these cases, the courts used this
"purification" interest to apply a jurisdiction's legal ethics regime to extraterritorial
attorney conduct in situations "where other contacts or governmental interests [were]
entirely absent.,
270
While this purification interest justifies Ohio disciplining an Ohio attorney for
conduct occurring in the electronic representation of a resident of Virginia, it does not
justify applying Ohio law to determine whether the attorney engaged in the unautho-
rized practice of law in Virginia or violated any ethical duty owed to the Virginia resi-
dent if Ohio's ethics rules differ from Virginia's rules.271 Ohio can protect its interest
by ensuring that the attorneys it licenses conduct themselves in an ethical manner
by asserting disciplinary jurisdiction over the attorneys and then applying Virginia's
ethics rules to the conduct in question.272
269 See id. at 27, 33-40 (discussing cases asserting that purification of a jurisdiction's bar
justified the application of its ethics rules to extraterritorial conduct of lawyers licensed by
that jurisdiction); see, e.g., People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Lindsey, 283 P. 539, 546 (Colo.
1929) ("The respondent's oath of office as an attorney and counselor at law is not only binding
here in Colorado but everywhere.... It abides with him at all times and places, and he will be
held responsible to this court for his misconduct as an attorney so long as his name continues
on the roll; nor can he put himself in a position which will place him beyond the inherent power
of this court to purify the bar of its unworthy members, and to keep its roster clean."); Fla. Bar
v. Wilkes, 179 So.2d 193, 196, 197 (Fla. 1965) (recognizing that "to ignore acts of professional
misconduct merely because they occurred outside this state would be to ignore our duty to pro-
tect the people of this state from one who has been held by another state to be... unfit" and
giving collateral estoppel effect to the factual findings of the other state's judgment but deter-
mining that "the discipline to be awarded for such acts by this state shall be determined by this
court and its agencies in the same manner as in all other disciplinary proceedings"); In re Veach,
287 S.W.2d 753, 759 (Mo. 1956) ("If one has been guilty of conduct inconsistent with the
standard expected of lawyers as officers of the court, it should make no difference whether the
acts were committed on this side or the other of a theoretical fence. There are no territorial
boundaries in cases of such misconduct. The wrong and the guilt is within the person himself,
and he carries it with him; he cannot be mentally and professionally pure in Missouri and
impure in Illinois.").
270 Ritts, supra note 97, at 55.
271 See id. at 34-35 ("[I1n the interest of bar 'purification,' a court has subject-matter juris-
diction to hear any case involving alleged professional misconduct of its attorneys; the purifi-
cation interest, however, is not so strong, standing alone, as to justify application of the foreign
state's rules where they conflict with the forum's rules which are more permissive.").
272 See id. at 40 (stating that "'purification' alone is not an adequate answer to choice-of-
law questions when they arise, since the purification goal was advanced equally well in both sets
of cases [where courts asserted disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys licensed in that state for
extraterritorial conduct], regardless of whether forum or foreign law was applied"). For two
cases applying identical reciprocal discipline to attorneys disbarred in another jurisdiction for
misconduct occurring in the other jurisdiction, see In re Harris-Smith, 871 A.2d 1183, 1184-85
(D.C. 2005), and In re Bameys, 861 A.2d 1270, 1274-75 (D.C. 2004). Furthermore, if ethics
rules are recognized as "only an imperfect representation of the 'moral purity' required for
the responsible practice of law, then a state's concern for attorneys' 'moral purity' cannot alone
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Moreover, assuming that Ohio has a purification interest in policing or purifying
its bar supports applying its ethics rules to the electronic representation concerned, this
should give way to the much greater interest of Virginia in protecting its citizens from
potentially incompetent legal representation, choosing the best manner in which to
balance its citizens' access to legal services against the ethical issues posed by elec-
tronic representations, and deciding how to best minimize the ethical concerns of such
representations. Therefore, in dormant commerce clause terms, the putative benefit
to the attorney's home jurisdiction in applying its ethics laws to electronic represen-
tations is negligible at best, while the benefit to the client's home jurisdiction is great.
C. The Safe Harbor Language of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) Invalidates the Choice of
Ethics Law Rule Under the Dormant Commerce Clause Because It Allows the
Ethics Laws of the Attorney's Home Jurisdiction to Apply to All Electronic
Representations
Upon examining the language of the current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2),
the lack of interest of the attorney's home jurisdiction in applying its ethics laws to
an electronic representation is problematic under the dormant commerce clause. Model
Rule 8.5(b)(2) initially applies the ethics "rules of the jurisdiction in which the law-
yer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different
jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction."27 3 It is unclear where an attorney's conduct
"occurred" in an electronic representation of a client, and neither the rule nor its com-
ments define these terms. Assuming the attorney and client are located in different
states, the attorney's conduct effectively occurs in two jurisdictions: in the attorney's
home jurisdiction where the attorney initiates the Internet communication and in the
jurisdiction where the client is located and receives the communication. Therefore,
depending on the point of view used, equally persuasive arguments can be presented
for the attorney's conduct having "occurred" in the attorney's home jurisdiction as well
as in the client's home jurisdiction. Consequently, comparing the interests of the juris-
dictions concerned according to where "the lawyer's conduct occurred," as stated in
the first part of the test set out in Model Rule 8.5(b)(2), is unhelpful because it is im-
possible to locate a single, discrete jurisdiction where the activity actually took place.
Examining where the "predominant effect" of an electronic representation occurs,
as used in the second part of the test used in Model Rule 8.5(b)(2), yields a more
meaningful comparison of the interests of the potential jurisdictions under a dormant
commerce clause analysis. In an attorney's electronic representation of a client, the
jurisdiction where the client is located (the client's home jurisdiction) has a legitimate
consumer protection interest in applying its ethics rules to this activity. For example,
justify application of its ethics rules in an extraterritorial manner, at least not where the other
jurisdiction has meaningful standards of professional conduct to apply." Ritts, supra note 97,
at 55.
273 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuct R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002).
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in the hypothetical electronic representation set out above, Virginia has a legitimate
interest in regulating the representation because the consequences of the representation
ultimately are felt in Virginia. This is why the safe harbor language of the current
version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) is problematic under the dormant commerce clause.
This language would not subject an attorney to discipline if his or her conduct con-
formed "to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the pre-
dominant effect of the lawyer's conduct" occurred.274 As explained above, the limited
authority available on where the "predominant effect" of an attorney's conduct occurs
gives an attorney, in almost all situations, reasonable grounds to argue that the ethics
law of his or her home jurisdiction apply to electronic representations. Some of this
authority appears to consider where the attorney physically drafted documents and
conducted research for the representation concerned,275 and in almost any electronic
representation this conduct will occur in the attorney's home jurisdiction.
Certainly, in this hypothetical situation, the Ohio attorney would have conducted
any research regarding whether the apartment complex discriminated against the
mother under applicable fair housing laws in his Ohio office. Similarly, the Ohio at-
torney would have drafted any documents needed in the representation in his Ohio
office. The case and administrative authority would add to the attorney's practical
arguments that he reasonably believed that Ohio ethics laws governed the electronic
representation of the Virginia resident because Ohio is his licensing jurisdiction and
the physical location in which he conducted the legal work. Thus, the safe harbor pro-
vision to Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) results in the ethics laws of the attorney's home juris-
diction almost always applying to electronic representations of clients.
Nevertheless, as established above, the attorney's home jurisdiction has little to
no interest in applying its ethics laws to electronic representations and thus derives
no benefit from regulating this activity. Therefore, a choice of law rule that results
in always applying the ethics law of the attorney's home jurisdiction to an attorney's
conduct in electronic representations fails to meet the minimum constitutional thresh-
old required under the dormant commerce clause for the application of that juris-
diction's laws.276
In fact, always applying the ethics regime of the attorney's home jurisdiction
to electronic attorney representations ignores the legitimate interest of the client's
jurisdiction in deciding how to best protect its residents. Thus in the hypothetical
situation the safe harbor language would allow Ohio law to control the type of legal
representation that a Virginia resident could use in order to get legal advice regarding
an incident that occurred in Virginia and in order to take action in Virginia. This
constitutes an impermissible burden on this activity. Consequently, due to the safe
274 Id. R. 8.5(b)(2).
275 See supra notes 153, 156-57, 168 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 187 and accompanying text (stating that dormant commerce clause
principles determine whether the application of a particular state's laws meets minimum con-
stitutional thresholds rather than determining the one jurisdiction's law that would be most
appropriate to apply in a given situation).
[Vol. 15:587
2006] E-LAWYERING, THE ABA & THE DORMANT COMMERE CLAUSE 651
harbor language, the current version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) violates the dormant
commerce clause.
CONCLUSION
States should consider adopting the 2002 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) without
the final sentence containing the safe harbor language. This would allow only the
jurisdiction where the largest effect from each representation is experienced to apply
its ethics rules to electronic representations. In many situations, this is going to be
the jurisdiction where the client physically is located, especially when the client acts
upon the legal advice obtained through the electronic representation in the client's
home jurisdiction.
Presumably, the safe harbor language is intended to protect attorneys from facing
conflicting obligations under the ethics rules of multiple jurisdictions. This lan-
guage, however, in conjunction with the limited authority on where the "predominant
effect" of multijurisdictional representations occurs and practical arguments regarding
an attorney's reasonable beliefs about where such effect occurs, will likely result in
the application of the ethics laws of the attorney's home jurisdiction to all electronic
representations. This outcome violates the dormant commerce clause because the
attorney's home jurisdiction obtains very little benefit from the application of its
laws in the vast majority of situations. Three jurisdictions, Florida, Indiana and New
Jersey, have already adopted the 2002 version of Model Rule 8.5 without the final safe
harbor sentence.277
Alternatively, jurisdictions could adopt a choice of ethics law rule that applies
the ethics laws of the client's jurisdiction to all electronic representations involving
residents of that state. A few states have done this, in effect, for all multijurisdiction
representations involving attorneys not licensed by the state that occur within that
state's boundaries, regardless of whether or not the representation occurs over the
Internet.278 This potentially could provide more clarity concerning which jurisdic-
tion's rules would apply to a particular electronic representation.
277 FLA. BAR R. 3-4.6; IND. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 8.5; N.J. RuLES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.5.
278 CAL. RULEs OF CT. R. 967 (allowing an attorney licensed and in "good standing" in
another United States jurisdiction to provide "legal advice in California to a client concerning
a transaction or other nonlitigation matter" as long as the attorney agrees that the provision
of legal services is subject to California's rules of professional conduct); COLO. R. Civ. P.
220 (allowing an attorney "licensed to practice law.. . in another jurisdiction in the United
States" and "in good standing of the bar of all courts and jurisdictions in which he or she is
admitted to practice" to "practice law in the state of Colorado ... subject to the Colorado
Rules of Professional Conduct"); NEV. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5A (requiring an
attorney "admitted and in good standing in another jurisdiction of the United States, and who
provides legal services for a Nevada client in connection with transactional or extra-judicial
matters that are pending in or substantially related to Nevada" to file an annual report, along
with a fee, to the State Bar of Nevada and to "familiarize himself or herself and comply with
the standards of professional conduct required of members of the State Bar of Nevada").
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However, as explained above, it is very difficult to determine exactly where an
electronic representation "occurs." Thus, even under such seemingly "bright line"
rules, it may still be difficult to determine exactly when the ethics rules of a par-
ticular jurisdiction apply to an electronic legal representation. Furthermore, depending
on the circumstances of the particular representation, the representation may have a
greater relationship with the attorney's home jurisdiction than the client's jurisdiction
despite components of the representation having occurred in the client's jurisdiction.
An example of this would be when a client communicates with an attorney over the
Internet about a matter governed by the law of the attorney's home jurisdiction and
requests the attorney physically to take some legal action in the attorney's home juris-
diction, such as submitting documents to a court or office located in that jurisdiction
or engaging in a legal transaction with other parties located in the attorney's home
jurisdiction. In these cases, the attorney's home jurisdiction would have a signifi-
cant interest in proscribing the ethical limitations of the representation.
Conversely, adopting the 2002 version of Model Rule 8.5(b) without the safe
harbor language contained in the last sentence of subsection 2 would still allow some
flexibility in applying the ethics rules of the jurisdiction with the most significant
relationship to a particular electronic representation. Moreover, this rule would avoid
the unconstitutional application of the legal ethics rules of the attorney's home juris-
diction to electronic representations in which that jurisdiction has very little to no
interest. Instead of applying the home jurisdiction's ethics laws when any remotely
plausible connection can be drawn between that jurisdiction and the representation at
issue, which always will be possible in an electronic representation, this choice of ethics
law rule would allow a court to examine the particular circumstances of each elec-
tronic representation and apply the ethics rules of the jurisdiction where the most
significant effect of the representation is felt.
A third option would be to retain the current safe harbor language but amend
Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) to include definitions for "conduct occurred" and "predominant
effect" that focus on the location of the client affected by the legal representation
and the jurisdiction where the legal advice provided in the representation is acted
upon and has effect. These definitions would eliminate any basis for an attorney to
argue that the "predominant effect" of a legal representation occurred in the juris-
diction where the attorney simply drafted legal documents or conducted legal research.
Therefore, by either eliminating the safe harbor language currently contained in Model
Rule 8.5(b)(2) or by precisely defining the key terms "conduct occurred" and "pre-
dominant effect," a jurisdiction can align the choice of ethics law determination more
closely to the actual interests the potential jurisdictions have in and the benefits they
receive from applying their legal ethics regimes to electronic representations.
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